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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse étudie le rôle du ·ystème bancaire et des marchés financiers dans le 
développement économique. Elle e t constituée de trois articles cientifiques : 
Le premier article utilise un modèle de croissance endogène du type Schumpétérien 
et un marché bancaire évoluant dans un environnement de concurrence imparfaite à la 
Cournot. ous montrons que la concentration bancaire a un effet négatif sur la croissance 
économique. De plus , cet effet est d'autant plu négatif pour les pays proches de la 
frontière technologique mondiale. Pour valider nos résultats théoriques nous utilisons 
des estimations économétriques avec des données en coupe transversale et en panel pour 
un ensemble de 125 pays sur la période 1980-2010. Nous montrons que la concentration 
bancaire diminue le taux de croissance annuel moyen du PIB par travailleur. Cet effet est 
d'autant plus négatif pour les pays proches de la frontière teclmologique mondiale. Nos 
résultats empiriques sont robustes à 1 utilisation du taux de croissance annuel moyen du 
PIB par tête et à l'introduction de variables macroéconomiques (taux d'inflation, taux 
de croissance de la masse monétaire, balance budgétaire, dépenses gouvernementales, et 
commerce), éducation, crédits privés et origines légales comme contrôles. 
Dans notre econd article de thè e, nou endogéneisons le nombre de banques. 
Pour cela, nous utilisons un modèle bancaire en concurrence bancaire imparfaite avec 
différenciation horizontale à la Salop (1979). Ce modèle nous permet ensuite d'étudier 
les effets des réformes bancaires sur la croissance économique. Les réformes bancaires 
sont mesurées par les coûts de transports qui séparent une banque et un entrepre-
neur représentatif. À l'aide de la libre entrée dans le secteur bancaire, nous montrons 
que effets des réformes bancaires sur la croissance économique dépendent du niveau du 
développement économique. Plus sp 'cifiquement, nous montrons à l'aide des institutions 
dites appropriées, qu 'il existe un seuil de développement économique à partir duquel les 
réformes bancaires sont bénéfiques pour la croissance économique. Ainsi, les réformes 
bancaires ont un effet positif sur la croissance économique pour les pays proches de la 
frontière technologique mondiale. Pour valider nos prédictions théoriques, nous effec-
x 
tuons des études empiriques pour 78 pays sur la période 1980-2010. ous montrons que 
les effets des réformes bancaires sur la croissance économique dépendent du niveau de 
développement technologique. De plus, les réformes bancaires ont un effet positif et si-
gnificatif pour les pays proches de la frontière technologique mondiale. Ce résultat reste 
valide à l'introduction de variables de contrôle et à l'utilisation de différentes techniques 
d'estimation économétriques. 
Le t roisième article de cette thèse étudie empiriquement les effets positifs de 
l'efficience bancaire sur la croissance économique en temps de crise économique. En effet , 
nous utilisons la crise financière et économique de 2009 comme un choc du côté de l'offre 
de crédits et nous montrons par la suite que les pays avec des systèmes bancaires efficaces 
résistent mieux et croissent plus vite. Cette efficience bancaire relaxe les contraintes de 
crédits pour les industries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. ous utili ons 
une méthode économétrique appelée Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) pour mesurer 
l'efficience bancaire et des estimations économétriques en coupes pays et industries . Nos 
résultats montrent que Peffi.cacité bancaire a un effet positif et significatif sur le taux de 
croissance réel pour les industries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. Cela 
implique qu 'un système bancaire efficace permet aux industries qui ont le plus besoin de 
financement externe d 'avoir plus de crédits en période de crise économique. o résultats 
restent robustes à l'utilisation de différentes mesures de dépendance financière. 
Mots clés : Croissance schumpétérienne, frontière technologique, concentration 
bancaire, réformes bancaires, institutions appropriées , efficience bancaire, dépendance 
financière, frictions financières. 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis we study the role of the banking sector and financial markets on 
economie development. It con ists of three scientific papers : 
In the first paper , we investigate the relationship between economie growth and 
bank concentration. We int roduce imperfect competition within the banking system 
according to the Schumpeterian growth paradigm, and we theoretically and empirically 
show that the effects of bank concentration on economie growth depend on proximity 
to the world technology frontier. The the01·y predicts th at bank concentration has a 
negative and ignificant direct effect on economie growth, especially for countries close 
to the frontier. We empirically verify our theoretical predictions by u ing cro s-country 
and panel data for 125 countries over the period 1980-2010. 
In the second paper, we endogenize the number of bank. and we t heoretically and 
empirically analyze the effects of banking reforms on gTowth according to the level of 
technological development of a country. Using a Schumpeterian growth paradigm and 
monopolistic competition between differentiated products of the banking system, we 
show that there is a thre hold of technological development from which banking refonns 
exert a positive effect on economie growth. To validate our theoretical predictions we 
use cross-country and panel estimates over the period 1980-2010 for 78 countries. We 
find that banking reforms enhance the average per-worker GDP growth for countries 
close to the world technology frontier. 
In the last paper, we use the recent financial crisis as a shock to the supply of 
credit , and we ana.lyze the effect of bank efficiency on value add d growth of firms in 
industries that are most dependent on external finance. Our main results how that 
bank efficiency rela.xed credit constraints and increased the growth rate for financially 
dependent industries during the crisis. This finding remains robust the introduction of 
control variables namely financia.l development bank concentration and competition , 
bank size and capitalization , bank upervision net interest margin overhead co ts, 
banking crises, monetary policy government intervention measures and macroeconomie 
variables interacted with external financial dependence. It also remains robust to the 
use of severa! m asures of external financial dependence and econometrie method . 
K EYWORDS : Schumpeterian growth technological frontier, bank concentra-
t ion, banking reforms, appropriate instit utions, bank efficiency, financial dependence, 
fina.ncial frictions. 
INTRODUCTIO 
Le débat entre développement financier et croissance économique ne date pas d'au-
jourd'hui, pom s'en rendre compte Schumpeter (1911) évoquait déjà ce lien. Il suggérait 
que le développement financier à travers un système bancaire efficace augmente la crois-
sance économique. Puisque plus les banques sont efficaces, plus elles prêtent et financent 
les projets les plus rentables et novateurs. Cette situation augmente la productivité des 
entreprises et il s'ensuit une croissance économique élevée. Dans la foulée de cet article 
de Schumpeter, les études sm le rôle positif du développement financier sur la croissance 
n 'ont cessé de croître. C est le cas notamment de Goldmisth (1969) qui utilise pom la 
première fois des estimations empiriques. À l'aide des données en coupe transversale sur 
la période 1860-1963, il découvre que la croissance moyenne est positivement corrélée 
à la taille du sectem financier. Pom pallier les lacunes posée par les estimations de 
Goldsmith (1969) , qui n'introduisait aucune variable de contrôle, les articles de King et 
Levine (1993a., 1993b) apportent un nouvel éclairage sur ce passionnant débat. Ainsi, à. 
l 'aide d'une régression de la. croissance moyenne du PIB par tête sur plusieurs variables 
de l'indicateur du développement financier et des variables de contrôle (le revenu initial 
pa.r tête, des mesures d 'éducation , des indicateurs de stabilité politique et économique), 
ils démontrent que le développement financier est un bon indicateur prévisionnel du 
taux de croissance par tête. lls mesurent le développement financier à l'aide de trois 
méthodes différentes, la première consistant à prendre le ratio entre les dettes liqtüdes 
du système financier et le PIB, la. seconde utilisant le ratio de crédit des banques de 
second rang sur les crédits bancaires plus les titres domestiques de la. Banque Centrale 
et enfin la dernière tenant compte du ratio des crédits accordés aux entreprises privées 
sur le PIB (Produit Intérieur Brut) . Ils montrent ainsi que le développement financier 
est un bon indicateur pour mesmer l'accumulation du capital physique et du change-
ment technologique pour un ensemble de 77 pays sur la. période 1960-1980. Bencivenga. et 
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Smith (1991) montrent que l'existence des banques fiables permet de bien gérer l 'épargne 
des ménages et ainsi leur apporter un niveau de vie important grâce aux rendements 
bancaires significatifs. P lus récemment Levine (2005) dans le Handbook of Economie 
Growth, résume cette revue de littérature comme suit : Les pays dans lesquels le système 
financier fonctionne : à savoir les marchés et les intermédiaires financi rs , pos èdent des 
taux de croissance plus rapide, ces résultats restent consistants à l'introduction de biais 
de simlùtanéité. li explique également qu'un bon fonctionnement du système financier 
desserre les contraintes de financement externes et permet aux firme. de pouvoir em-
prunter facilement et de produire plus. Aghion et aL (2005) dans leur article célèbre 
publié dans Quaterly Journal of Economies utilisent un modèle de croi sance endogène 
du type schumpétérien et un modèle bancaire avec contraintes de crédit pour analyser 
la relation entre le développement financier et la croissance économique. Ils montrent 
que la contrainte de crédit e t un facteur important pour expliquer la convergence ou 
la divergence entre les pays. Plus particulièrement, ils montrent, théoriquement et em-
piriquement , que le développement financier a un impact sur la croissance économique 
selon que le pays est proche ou est éloigné de la front ière technologique. Ils obtiennent 
des résultats qui cla'3sent les pays en trois catégories. La première catégorie concerne 
des pays qui convergent à long terme vers l'état stationnaire il s'agit de pays qui ne 
ubissent pas de contraintes de crédit et donc le développement financier n 'a aucun 
impact ni sur la croissance ni sur le niveau du PIB à l'état stationnaire. La deuxième 
est une catégorie de pays dont le développement financier est moyen. Dans ces pays le 
développement financier n'a aucun impact sur la croissance, mais il affecte le niveau du 
PIB à l'état stationnaire. Pour la dernière catégorie, il s'agit de pays qui divergent à long 
terme. La contrainte de crédit dans ces pays est très forte et le développement financier 
est faible, il y a donc un effet négatif et significatif sur la croissance économique. 
L'objectif principal de cette thèse est d 'apporter une contribution scientifique 
pertinente à ce débat. Ainsi , nous étudions l'importance du développement financier et 
le rôle du système bancaire dans le développement économique en tenant compte de la 
structure microéconomique du marché bancaire. La thèse est constituée de trois articles 
3 
scientifiques pertinents. En effet , dans le premier article, nous analysons théoriquement 
et empiriquement les effets de la concentration bancaire sur la croissance économique. 
Dans le second article, nous étudions à l'aide d'un mod' le théorique et empirique les 
effets des réformes bancaires sur la croissance économique en fonction du niveau du 
développement technologique. Et enfin, dans le dernier article nous mesuron les effets 
positifs de l'efficience bancaire sur la croissance économique durant la crise économique 
de 2009. 
L'intérêt démontré pour ces questions s'explique pour plusieurs raisons. Premièrement , 
plusieurs des études susmentionnées ut ilisent des estimations empiriques pour mesurer 
les effets du développement financier sur la croissance économique. Deuxièmement , ces 
études ne t iennent pas compte de la structure microéconomique du marché bancaire 
à savoir : la concentration, la concmrence et l'efficience bancaires. Troisièmement, la 
li ttérature existante sur le lien entre la croissance et la strucuture microéconomique du 
bancaire trouve des résultats contradictoires et ambigus. De plus, rar·es sont ces études 
qui utilisent des modèles théoriques pour analyser les effets de la structure du marché 
bancaire sur le développement économique. En effet, Ceterolli (2002) étudie empirique-
ment les effets de la concentration bancaire sur la croissance. Il utilise la méthode offerte 
par Raj a.n et Zinga.les (1998) avec des données en coupe pays-indu tries pour montrer 
que la concentration dans le sectem· bancaire augmente le taux de croissance pour les 
indust ries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. Cependant , il trouve que cet 
effet est très faible pour les pays avec un niveau de développement financier faible. Beek 
et al. (2004) utilisent la même méthodologie et démontrent que la concentration dans le 
secteur bancaire augmente les contrainte de crédit pour les firmes. Deidda et Fattouh 
(2005) utilisent un modèle de croissance endogène du type AK et un marché bancaire 
en concurrence imparfaite, et montrent que la concentration bancaire exerce deux ef-
fets opposés sur la croissance économique. Pom les États-Unis, Goldberg et al. (2000) 
montrent que la concentration bancaire affecte positivement le niveau des crédits ac-
cordés aux petites et moyennes firmes dar1s les zones urbaines, mais négativement dans 
les zones rurales. 
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Le premier article de cette thèse utilise un modèle de croissance endogène du type 
schurnpétérien et un marché bancaire évoluant dans 1.111 environnement de concurrence 
imparfaite à la Cournot. Le choix pour un modèle de croissance endogène du type 
schumpétérien s'explique par le fait que les modèles de croissance néoclassique et les 
modèles de croissance endogène à la Romer soulèvent plusieurs questions. Dans le cadre 
néoclassique, les modèles parlent d 'un progrès technologique exogène qui explique la 
croissance sans pour autant justifier clairement l'origine de ce progrès technique. Dans 
les modèles à variétés de biens de Romer, c'est la pos ibilité de création de nouvelles 
variétés de biens intermédiaires par le canal de l'innovation qui augmente le PIB. Ces 
modèles ne tiennent pas compte de l'obsolence des inputs intermédiaires les plus anciens. 
De ce fait , une disparition de ceux-ci diminue automatiquement le PIB. Dans le modèle 
de croissance schumpétérie1me que nous présentons , la qualité du bien a w1e importance 
cruciale pour la croissance économique. Les premières tentatives d'utilisation de ce type 
de modèles sont dues à Aghion et Howitt (1992) qui utilisent les outils de l 'économie 
industrielle pour mesurer le degré de concurrence pour la productivité. La modélisation 
dans un cadre de concurrence imparfaite à la Cournot nous permet d 'introduire les 
effets de la concentration bancaire mesurée par l'indice de Herfindahl sur la croissance 
économique. 
Nos premiers résultats montrent que la concentration bancaire a un effet négatif 
sur la croissance économique. De plus, cet effet est d 'autant plus négatif pour les pays 
proches de la frontière technologique mondiale. Ce résultat s'explique en partie par le 
fait que la concentration bancaire diminue les montants accordés aU-x entrepreneurs 
parce qu'elle augmente les taux d'intérêts des emprunts. Ainsi, il en résulte une baisse 
de l'innovation et donc de la croissance économique. Nous observons des opportunités 
d'innovation plus importantes pour les pays proches de la front ière technologique, une 
hausse de la concentration bancaire diminuant les montants alloués à l'innovation, il 
s'ensuit une baisse importante de la croissance économique pour ces pays. Pour valider 
nos résultats théoriques, nous utilisons des estimations économétriques avec des données 
en coupe transversale et en panel pour un ensemble de 125 pays sur la période 1980-
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2010. Nous démontrons que la concentration bancaire diminue le taux de croissance 
annuel moyen du PIB par travailleur. Cet effet est d'autant plus négatif et significatif 
pour les pays proches de la frontière technologique mondiale. Nos résultats empiriques 
sont robustes à l'utilisation du taux de croissance annuel moyen du PIB par tête et 
à l'introduction de variables macroéconomiques (ta.ux d'inflation, taux de croissance 
de la masse monétaire, balance budgétaire, dépenses gouvernementales, et commerce) , 
éducation, crédits privés et origines légales comme contrôles et à 1 'utilisation de plusieurs 
techniques économétriques. 
Dans notre second article, nous endogénéisons le nombre de banques qui est une 
donnée exogène dans le premier chapitre. Pour cela, nous utilisons un modèle ban-
caire en concurrence imparfaite avec différenciation horizontale à la Sa.lop (1979). Ce 
modèle nous permet ensuite d'étudier les effets des réforme bancaires sur la croissance 
économique. Les réformes bancaires sont mesurées pru· les coûts fixes d'entrée. À l'aide 
de la libre entrée dans le secteur bancaire, nous montrons que les réformes bancaires 
affectent la croissance économique. Les intuitions de ce réstùtat s'expliquent par le fait 
que les réformes bancaires par la libre entrée facilitent l 'accès aux crédits pour les in-
novateurs en diminuant les taux d'emprunts. Des réformes bancaires en profondeur, 
par exemple la libre entrée dans le secteur bancaire, permettent au pays de croître et 
d'avoir des taux de croissance élevés. Pour valider nos prédictions théoriques, nous ef-
fectuons des études empiriques pour 78 pays sur la période 1980-2010. Nous montrons 
que les réformes bancaires affectent sur la croissance économique selon le niveau du 
développement économique. De plus, les réformes bancaires qnt un effet positif et signi-
ficatif pour les pays proches de la frontière technologique mondiale. Ce résultat reste 
valide à l'introduction de variables de contrôle et à l'utllisation de différentes techniques 
d'estimation économétriques. 
Le troisième article de notre thèse étudie empiriquement les effets positifs de 
l 'efficience bancaire ur la croissru1ce économique en temps de crise économique. Nous 
utilisons la crise financière et économique de 2009 comme un choc du côté de l'offre de 
crédits et nous montrons par la suite que les pays avec des systèmes bancaires efficients 
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résistent mieux et croissent plus vite. ous utilisons une méthode économétrique appelée 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) pour mesurer l 'efficience bancaire et des estimations 
économétriques en coupes pays et industries. Pour la première fois, nous analysons 
le lien entre le développement financier et la croissance éoonomique en utilisant une 
vraie mesure de l'efficience bancaire ou du développement financier. Ceci nous permet 
de nous différencier de la littérature existante qui utiHse le niveau de crédits privés 
sur le PIB comme mesure du développement financier. L'utilisation des données pays-
industries nous permet entre autres de contrôler pour les variables omises et de traiter 
en profondeur la question liée à l'endogénéité. Notre échantillon final est composé de 
37 pays et de 36 industries pour un total de 2611 observations. Nou. ut ilisons ensuite 
la méthode de Rajan et Zingales (1998) , en régressant le taux de croissance annuel 
en termes réels de la valeur ajoutée de l'industrie j et du pays k sur les variables 
muettes pays et industries, l 'interaction entre la dépendance financière de l'industrie j 
et l'efficience bancaire du pays k et différents types de variables contrôle du pays k. 
Nous montrons que l'efficience bancaire relaxe les contraintes de crédits pour les 
industries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. De plus nos résultats montrent 
que l 'efficience baJ1caire a un effet positif et significatif sur le taux de croissance réel pour 
les industries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. Cela implique qu'un système 
bancaire efficient permet aux industries qui ont le plus besoin de finaJ1cement externe 
d 'avoir plus de crédits en période de crise économique. Pour dissocier les effets réels de 
not re mesure de l'efficience bancaire sur la croissaJ1Ce à d'autres variables, nous intro-
duisons différents types de vaJ·iables de contrôle. Nous contrôlons pour le développement 
financier du pays en introduisant 1 'interaction ent re la capitalisation boursière, la ca-
pitalisation totale et la dépendance financière. Notre résultat reste valide, et montre 
que l'efficience baJ1caire facilite l'accès aux crédits pour les industries qui ont le plus 
besoin de financement externe. Nous contrôlons également pour la concentration et la 
concurrence baJ1caires, la supervision bancaire, le PIB réel, le commerce, l'inflation le 
taux de change, la politique monétaire, les mesures gouvernementales annoncées pour 
contrer la crise économique (actifs annoncés, actifs utilisés, garanties bancaires , support 
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en liquidités), la taille du marché bancaire, la capitalisation bancaire et les crises ban-
caires. Nos résultats restent également robustes à l'utilisation de différentes mesures de 
dépendance financière. Les prochaines sections présentent en détail les trois chapitres 
de la thèse. 
Mots-clés : Croissance schumpétérienne, front ière technologique, concentration 
bancaire, réformes bancaires, institutions appropriées, efficience bancaire, dépendance 
financière, frictions financières. 
CHAPTER I 
BANK CO CE TRATIO AND SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH: THEORY 
A D I ITER ATIO AL EVIDE TCE 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between economie growth and bank concen-
tration. We introduce imperfect competition within the banking system according to 
the Schumpeterian growth paradigm, and we theore"tically and empirically show that 
the effects of bank concentration on economie growth depend on proximity to the world 
technology frontier. The theory predicts that bank concentration has a negative and si-
gn.ificant direct effect on economie growth, especially for countries close to the frontier. 
We empirically verify our theoretical predictions by using cross-country and panel data 
for 125 countries over the period 1980-2010. 
KEYWORDS : Schumpeterian gwwth , bank concentration, technological fron-
tier. 
JEL : 03, 016, C21 , C23. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The role of financial development in economie growth, first outlined by Schum-
peter (1912) as allowing for botter capital allocation, is now at the heart of economie 
growth literature. The first serious attempt to empirically estimate the relation, bet-
ween financial development and economie growth dates back to Robert King and Ross 
Levine. Indeed, King and Levine (1993a.) used a cross-country perspective and found 
that varions measures of the level of financial development are strongly associated with 
real per capita GDP gTowth, the rate of physical capital accumulation , and improve-
ments in the efficiency with which economies employ physica.l capital. King and Levine 
(1993b) show that the level of a country's financial development helps predict its rate of 
economie gTowth for the following 10 to 30 years . Since then, a large body of literature, 
exhaustively reviewed by Levine (2005), has estimated this relation using numerous 
robustness checks to corroborate the intuition of Schumpeter (1912). 
In thi paper, we propose to evàluate the effect of bank concentration on economie 
growth, both theoretically and empirically, using the Schumpeterian growth paradigm. 
The literature devoted to the effects of bank concentration on economie growth has led 
to different and ambiguous results. Our purpose in this article is to clarify this relation 
by answering the two following main questions : What are the effects of bank concentra-
tion on economie growth in a theoretical aJ1d empirieal framework? How do these effects 
evolve for a given country according to its proximity to the world technology frontier? 
The answer to both of these questions allows us to take a position in the existing litera-
ture mainJy to provide a botter understanding of the effects of maJ·ket power and bank 
concentration on economie growth through a theoretical model validated by empirical 
estimates. We use an endogenous growth model, namely the Schumpeterian growth pa-
radigm inspired by Aghion et al. (2005), where the engine of growth is considered to 
be innovation. Another merit of this model is that it takes înto account the effects of 
convergence and divergence between countries as opposed to neoclassical growth models 
and first generations of endogenous growth models such as AI< or varieties of interme-
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diate goods of Romer (1990). Final output technology combines labor and intermediate 
inputs, and these intermediate inputs are produced by innovators (entrepreneurs) who 
enjoy monopoly power because they operate the technology that is closest to the fron-
tier. Endogenous gwwth and convergence to the fronber are driven by innovation in 
the intermediate ector, which is performed by entreprenems needing external finance. 
Innovators (entrepreneurs) face a cost (th us they borrow), w hi ch depends on the success 
probability and is proportional to the technological level of the frontier. If successful, 
they enjoy profits which are proportional to the frontier technology. Innovators do not 
take the interest rate as given but interact strategically with banks. Hence, expected pro-
fitabiHty from R&D depends on the amount inve ted in three ways : negatively because 
it is a cost, positively because it increases the probability of entrepreneurial innovation, 
and it reduces the interest rate on loans. To measme the effects of bank concentration 
on innovation in our model, we use imperfect Cournot competition in t he banking sec-
tor. The banking s ctor is composed of n identical banks, which collect deposits and 
offer loans to entrepreneurs. The deposits sector is assumed to be perfect competition, 
while t he loans . ector bas evolved according to imperfect Cournot competition. This 
last assumption allows us to capture the effects of bank concentration measured by the 
Herfindahl index on economie growth. 
T he effect · of bank concentration on economie growth have been studied by 
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) using an AK endogenous growth model. They .find that 
reduction in the level of concentration in the banking industry exerts two opposite 
effects on economie growth. On the one hand, it induces economies of specialization, 
which enhances intermediation efficiency and thereby economie growth. On the other 
hand , it results in the duplication of fixed costs, which are detrimental to efficiency and 
growth. Our article does not explore the channel of capital accumulation as did Deidda 
and Fattouh (2005) or Ba.dunenko and Romero-Avila (2013), who found that a sub-
stantial part of the productivity growth attributable to physical capital accumulation 
should be associated wit h the allocative efficiency role of financial development using 
nonparametric production frontier and adding .financial development. Our empirical re-
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sults are robust, through the use of bank efficiency (net interest margin and overhead 
costs), as , uggested by Badunenko and Romero-Avila (2013) for financial efficiency, 
in columns (6) and (7) of Table 1.9. In this article, we demonstrate that the effect of 
bank concentration on economie gwwth is due to tlu·ee channels. The first channel i 
captured by the loan rate tlu·ough imperfect Cournot competition in the banking sys-
tem; the second channel is measured by the probability of entrepreneurial innovation 
t hrough the Schum.peterian endogenous growth model; and the last channel deal. · with 
the proximity to t he world technology frontier to explain the effects of convergence 
among countries through bank concentration. Several empirical studies show that high 
bank concentration increases the cost of the credits, as suggested by Hannan (1991), 
who finds strong evidence that concentration is associated with higher interest rates 
across U.S. banking markets. Cetorelli (2002) explores the effect of the banking market 
structure on the market structure of industrial sectors. He finds that banking concen-
t ration enhances industry market concentration, especially in sectors highly dependent 
on external finance. However , these effects are weaker in coLmtries characterized by hi-
gher overall financial development. Empirically, Beek et al. (2004) u e a cro s-country 
approach with firm-level data and investigate the effects of bank competition on firm 
financing constraints and access to credit. They show that bank concentration increases 
financing constraints and decrease the likelihood of receiving bank financing for small 
and medium-size firms, but not for large firms . Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that 
t he competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending re-
lationships and they find empirical evidence that creditors are more likely to finance 
credit-constrained fi rms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for 
these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. Goldberg et al. (2000) 
how across local U.S. banking markets that concentration affects small business lending 
positively in urban markets and negatively in rural markets. Vve add a novelty to these 
studies by theoretically testing the effects of bank concentration on the costs of credit; 
our fir t theoretical result show that bank concentration increases the co t of credit for 
entrepreneurs and at the same t ime exerts a direct negative effect on economie growth 
through innovation. 
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Wc theoretically show that the probability of entrcpreneurial innovation is a de-
creasing function of bank concentration as measured by the Herfinda.hl index. This result 
allows us to verify the empirica.l results obtained in the literature on the relationship 
between bank concentration and the creation of new firms. Sorne authors use empirical 
investigation to illustrate the effects of bank concentration on the formation of firms , 
such as Black and Stra.l1a11 (2002), who find evidence across U.S . states that higher 
concentration re ults in less new finn formation, especially in states and periods with 
regulated banking markets. Howevcr, Cetorelli and Ga111bcra (2001) study the empirical 
relevance of the banking market structure on growth and show that bank concentration 
promotes the growth of the industria.l sectors that are more in need of external finru1ce 
by facilitating credit access to younger firms. They also find a general depressing effect 
on growth associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors 
and firms indiscriminately. 
In arder to answer the second question of om article, we measure the effects of 
bank concentration on the probability of entrepreneuria.l innovation according to the 
proximity to the world technology frontier for a given country. We theoretically show 
that bru1k concentration has a significant, direct effect on economie gTowth and that 
this effect is even more negative and significant when the country is close to the world 
technology frontier. These results contradict th ose of Deidda and Fattouh (2005), who 
empirically find that bank concentration is negatively associated with industrial growth 
only in low-income countries, while there is no such association in high-income countrie . 
Despite the negative effect of bank concentration on economie gTOwth t hrough financing 
constrajnts, Beek et al. (2004) found that the connection between bank concentration 
and financing constraints is reduced in cotmtries >vith an efficient legal system, good 
poverty rights protection, less corruption, b tter developed credit registries, and a large 
mru·ket share of foreign banks, while a greater extent of public bank owner hip exacer-
bates the relation. In addition, t hese results do not explore the effects of bank concen-
t ration on the convergence a111ong countries in a theoretical fraJ.Tiework, and the results 
ru·e obtained using cross-country evidence. \Ve include in our specifications banking re-
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gulation variables ( activity restriction, required reserves, bank development, and official 
supervisory power) as in Beek et al. (2004). The results are presented in columns (2)-
(5) of Table 1.9. We significantly expand on such findings using panel and cross-country 
data of 125 countries over the period 1980-2010 to show that bank concentration has 
a negative and significant direct effect on the average per \VOrker GDP growth and 
that this effect is even more negative and significant when the country is close to the 
world technology frontier. These findings remain robust to the use of the average per 
capita GDP growth rate, as shown in Table 1.7. In addition, our results are robust 
due to the use of multiple measures of bank concentration, multiple measures of GDP 
growth (Penn World Table 7.1 and Penn World Table 8.0) , and the introduction of se-
veral types of control variables : financial development, school, macroeconomie policies 
(money growth, inflation, budget balance governrnent consurnption, and trade), bank 
regulation (activity restriction , required reserves, bank development, and official super-
visory powers) , bank efficiency (net interest margin and overhead cost. ), instit utional 
policies (British, French, and German legal origins) and multiple econometrie methods, 
such as ordinary least squares (OLS), Instrumental Variables (IV) and Arrellano-Bond 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. 
In summary, our paper introduces several crucial novelties to the existing litera-
ture. First, while most papers use empirical cross-country estimates to test the effects of 
bank concentration on economie growth, our paper uses a theoretical model to mea. ure 
t he effects of bank concentration according to the proximity to the world technology 
frontier for a given country, as well as empirical estimates to validate our theoretical 
rnodel. Second, to our knowledge, our theoretical model and empirical estimates are the 
fh·st in the literature to establish the link between bank concentration and economie 
growth according to a Schumpeterian growth para.digm. Finally, our sample includes 
developed, developing, and emerging countries. To test the robustness of our results , 
we use several estimation methods and several types of control variables. The remain-
der of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the basic structure of the 
theoretical rnodel , section 1.3 confronts t he theoretical predictions by using empirical 
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inve tigation, and ection 1.4 summarizes the findings. 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
1.2.1 A simple Schumpeterian theoretical framework 
We use the theoretical Schumpeterian gTowth paradigm developed over the past 
decade by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) , Aghion et al. (2005) , and Acemoglu et 
al. (2006) . Time is considered discrete, and there is a continuum of individuals in each 
country. There are J countries, indexed by j = 1, ... , J , which do not exchange goods and 
factors but are technologically interdependent in the sense tha.t they use technological 
ideas developed el ewhere in the world. Each country has a fixed population, L , which 
we normalize to one L = 1, so that aggregate and per capita quantities coïncide. Each 
individual lives two periods and is endowed with two unit of labor services in the 
first period and none in the second . The utility function is assumed to be linear in 
consumption, so that U = c1 + f3cz, where c 1 and c2 represent consumption in the first 
and second periods of !ife, respectively and f3 E (0, 1) is the rate at which individuals 
discount the utility consumption in the second period relative to that in the first. 
Production of final good. Consider a cow1try j, where in t hat follow we drop country-
index without Joss of generality, where there is only one general good Yt , taken as the 
numéraiœ produced by specialized intermediate goods and labor as 
yt = L 1-o: fol At(ll)1-o:Xt(v)<J< dll with 0 <a < 1 (1.1) 
where Xt(ll) is the country input of intermediate good li such that liE [0, 1], and At( li) 
is the technological productivity pa.rameter associated with it. The final good is used 
for consumption, as an input into entrepreneurial innovation and the production of 
intermediate goods. Producers of the general good act as per·fect competitors in all 
markets , so that the inverse demand for intermediate goods and labor are given by 
{ 
Pt(ll) = ŒXt(ll)a- l At(ll)l-o: for all sectors v E [0, 1] (FOC) (1.2) 
Wt=(1-a)Yt 
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Production of intermedia.te goods. For ea.ch intermediate good v , there is an innova.tor 
who enjoys a. monopoly power in the production of this intermedia.te good and produces 
a unit of the intermediate good by using 1 unit of the final good. The finn maximizes 
its profits given by 
(1.3) 
The first order condition allows us to find the equilibrium quantity of intermediate good 
2 
v of quality At(v) given by Xt(v) = o:~-n At(v). The equilibrium priee of the intermediate 
good vis given by : Pt(v) = a-1, so that the equilibrium profit of intermediate firm is 
written as 
~ 7rt( v) = (1- a)al -<> At(v) = nAt(v) (1.4) 
l +a 
where 1r = (1- a)a 1-"' so that the profit earned by the incumbent in any. ector v will 
be proportional to the productivity parameter in that sector. 
Net output and growth rate. Substituting the equilibrium quantity Xt(v ) into the final 
good production function (1.1) shows that the equilibrium gross output of the general 
good is proportional to the average productivity parameter, defined as At= fol At(v)di.J , 
so that 
(1.5) 
as well as wages 
(1.6) 
2a 
where w = (1 - O')a 1- a- . Finally, let Yinet represent the net output, defined as gross 
output minus the cost of intermediate goods, which enters in the production of the 
general good. Thus : 
{1 ~ 
Yinet = yt- Jo Xt(v) dv = (1- a)(1 + a)a 1 -<> At (1. 7) 
Therefore, the growth rate of net output is the same for the average productivity para-
meter : 1 + 9t = AAt . Vve focus on this last formula to determine the growth properties 
t-1 
of a particular country. 
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T e c h n o l o g i c a . l  c h a n g e .  F o l l o w i n g  A g h i o n  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  i n  e a c h  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d  s e c t o r  
v ,  a  c o n t i n u u m  o f  p e r s o n s  w i t h  a n  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  i d e a  i s  b o r n  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  t  c a p a b l e  o f  
p r o d u c i n g  a n  i n n o v a t i o n  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  t +  1 ,  a n d  i f  s u c c e s s f u l  b e c o m e s  t h e  v t h  i n c u m b e n t  
a t  t  +  1 .  W e  d e n o t e  f . i . t + l  ( v )  a s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  i n n o v a t i o n ,  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  t e c h n o l o g y  o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d s  s e c t o r  v  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  t  +  1  ,  A t + l ( v )  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o c e s s  :  
{  
A t + l  
A t + l ( l / )  =  A t ( v )  
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  f . i . t + l ( v )  
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 - f . i . t + l ( v )  
w h e r e  A t + l  d e n o t e s  t h e  w o r l d  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o n t i e r ,  w h i c h  g r o w s  a t  t h e  c o n s t a n t  r a t e  
g  >  O .  T h e  e x p e c t e d  l e v e l  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  s e c t o r  v  t h u s  e v o l v e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
A t + l ( v )  =  f . k t + l ( v ) A t + l  +  ( 1 - f . k t + l ( v ) ) A t ( v )  
( 1 . 8 )  
I n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  a s  w e  s h o w  b e l o w ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  i n n o v a t i o n  w i l l  b e  
t h e  s a m e  i n  e a c h  s e c t o r  :  f . i . t H  ( v )  =  f . k t + l ·  R e p l a c i n g  a n d  i n t e g r a t i n g  t h i s  e q u a t i o n  o n  
b o t h  s i d e s ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  b e c o m e s  
A t + l  =  f . k t + 1 11 t + l  +  ( 1 - f . k t + l ) A t  ( 1 . 9 )  
L e t  u s  d e n o t e  a t _  =  ~t a s  t h e  p r o x i m i t y  t o  t h e  w o r l d  t e c h n o l o g y  f r o n t i e r  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  
A t  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  a  c o u n t r y .  I t s  d y n a m i c s  i s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  l a w  o f  m o t i o n  :  
1  
a t + 1  =  f . k t + l  +  
1  
+  g  ( 1  - f . k t + l ) a t  
( 1 . 1 0 )  
D e m a n d  f o r  l o a n s .  A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  p e r i o d ,  a  h o u s e h o l d  h a s  t h e  o p -
p o r t u n i t y  t o  b e c o m e  a n  e n t r e p r e n e u r  ( i n n o v a t o r )  w h e r e  t h e  c o s t  o f  i n n o v a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  
b y l  
Z t 2 " 1 ( v )  =  1 / J f . i . t + l ( v ) < i >  
A t + l  
( 1 . 1 1 )  
w h e r e  Z t + l  ( v )  i s  t h e  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  f i n a l  g o o d ,  1p  >  0  i s  a  p a r a m e  t e r  
t h a t  a f f e c t s  t h e  c o s t  o f  i n n o v a t i o n ,  a n d  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  < j J  ; : : : : :  2  i n  o r d e r  t o  w r u T a n t  t h e  
1 .  F o r < / ; =  2 ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  i n n o v a t i o n  i s :  Z A t + l ( v )  =  ~ J.I.t.+
1
(v)
2 
t + l  
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existence of the equilibrium probability to innovate. The total investment is adjusted to 
t he world technology frontier At+l to take into a.ccount that it becomes more expensive 
to maintain an innovation rate f.ht+1 (v) as the technological frontier a.dvances. 
The households eam a wage at the end of t he fi rst period, Wt given by (1.6), which 
they ave in the bank with a return rate rv ,t · They borrow the amount (Zt+l(v)- (1 + 
·rv,t)wt) = Tt+l(v) from the bank becau ethe wage received is not ufficient to initiate 
an innovation. Therefore, in equili brium, f-i.t+l(v) will be chosen by the innovators so as 
to maximize the expected net profits as 
max 1l'At+ l(v)f-i.t~l ( v)- (1 + rt+l) [Zt+l(v) - (1 + rv,t)Wt]- (1 + rv ,t)Wt 
{J.Lt+l (11)} 
[f-i.t+I(v)7r- 'l/J (1 + ·rt I)J.ht+l(v) <P ] At+l(v) + rt+l(1 + ·rv ,t)Wt 
where rt+l is the loan rate. So, in equilibrium, the probability of entrepreneuria.l inno-
vation is the same in ea.ch sector : 
(1.12) 
Sub tit uting equation (1.12) into equation (l. ll ) and using Zt+l (v) - (1 + rv ,t)Wt = 
Tt+I(v) allows us to find the demand for loans for innovators, which decrea.ses with the 
loan rate (rt+1), and the innovation cost parameter ('1/J ), which increases with the world 
technology fronti er (At+ 1) and net profits ( 1!'). Denoting that t he wa.ge is proportional 
to local procluctivity such that Wt = wAt, as displayed in equation (1.6) , the demand 
for loans, ·identical in each sector, is given by 
(1.13) 
1.2.2 Banking sector 
We model the ba.nking sector in the context of Cournot competition for loans, and 
we assume perfect competition for deposits, (as initially propo. ed by 1onti (1972) and 
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Klein (1971) and reviewed in Freixas-Rochet (2008). The banking sector is composed of 
n identica.l banks indexed by i = 1, ... , n. Bank i pays linear transaction cost s between 
loans and deposits C(D t+ l (i), Tt+l (i)) = ')'DDt+I(i ) + !T'Zt+l(i), where I D: 'YT E [0 , 1] 
are cost para.meters associated with the deposits and loans activities, respectively. In 
the period t + 1, the bank chooses Tt+1 ( i) and Dt+l ( i) so as to maximize its profits 
given by 
rrf+l (i) ~ ( r,+J(i)l't+l t, 1;+1 (k) - 'lT) Tt+1 (i) - T Bw (i) - (rD,t+1 + ~D )Dt+,(i) 
(1.14) 
and subject to the following constrain ts : 
tb 
Tt+ I(i ) = '1/J [ 4>1,b (l~rt+ 1 ) ] </>- 1 At+l- (1 + rv,t)WA t 
B t+ I(i) = Rt+l('i) + Tl+I (i)- Dt+l (i) (1.15) 
R t+ I (i ) = eDt+l (i ) 
In these constraints, Tt+l (i ) is the de.mand for loan of t he bank i, and B t+1 (i ) is t he net 
posit ion of bank i on the inter bank market according to t he sum of the reserves R t+l ( i) 
and loans, minus deposits. Rt+1 (i) is the reserves of bank i, equal to a proport ion e of 
depo its. The interbank rate (T) and the coefficient of compulsory re erves (e ) may be 
used as policy instruments by which t he Central Bank t ries to influence monetary and 
credit policies, as noted by Freixas and Rochet (2007). Substit ut ing the constraints, the 
problem becomes 
subject to 
</> 
Tt+1 = '1/J [ c/J'I/J(1 : rt+l) ] <t>-
1 
At+l- (1 + rv,t)WAt 
The banks have the same linear cost fun ction and the same demand for loan.<; ; thus a. 
unique equilibrium is given by Tt+l (i) = T~; 1 , so t hat the first order condit ions are 
(FOC) 
{ 
r D,t+l = rD = T(1 - e) -/D 
r~+l T t+ l/-Lt+ lH + r t+l f-L t+ l = T + /T 
(1.16) 
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The first condition shows that the deposits return rate is constant, and depends posit i-
vely on t he interbank rate (T) but negatively on the coefficient of reserves (8) and the 
deposits management costs (10 ). The second condi tion allows us to find the loan rate 
according to the elasticity of the demand for loans : 
r t+lf-Lt+l - ( T + /T) 
rt+l f-Lt+l 
H 
E 
(1.17) 
where ~ is the inverse of the elast icity of the demand for loans, and H is the Herfindahl 
index. This condit ion shows the well-known Lerner index, which represents the market 
power of the bank. The inverse of t he elasticity of the demand for loans is given by 2 
E 
7/J(cp- 1)(1 + rt+1)2 w(qJ - 1)(1 + ro,t )(1 + rt+l ? 
1ïrt+ l - 1ï'1't+1 [ <i>7P (l~rt+ l ) J .P~l a t (1.18) 
1 
where W =: 1~9 . vVe assume that r t+ l < {w [T(1- e) + (1 - ID)] at}l- if> ( *) 2- if> ~ - 1, 3 
to ensure that the Lerner index is positive. Using equations (1.12) , (1.17) , and (1.18) 
allows us to find the implicit relat ion between the Joan ra.te r t+1, the proximity to the 
world technology frontier at, and the Herfindalù index H such that 4 
We derive, from this expression, the effect of the proximity to the world technology 
front ier on the loan rate rt+l· 
Proposition 1. If cp 2: 2, then the loan rate r t+1 is a decreasing function of the proxi-
. . 8rt+l 
mzty to the world technology fro ntzer a t : -
8
- - < 0. 
at 
Proof See Appendix C. • 
2. See Appendix A . 
3. See Appendix B. 
4. See Appendix C. 
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If the cost of innovation is convex, and the Lerner index is positive, the impli-
cation for proposit ion 1 is that countries close to the world technology frontier have 
higher wages, implying that the entrepreneurs in the innovation sector are self-financing 
a significant amount of their project and therefore paying a smaller amount to the 
bank. T hus, the loa.n rate for innovators is reduced when the country is close to the 
technological frontier. 
The following proposition establishes the link between loan rate and bank concen-
tration. It shows theoretically that an increase in bank concentration increases the cost 
of credit for innova.tors . 
Proposition 2. If rjJ 2: 2 and Tt+l < {w [T(1- e) + (1 -ID)] at}l-<i> ( ~) 2- </> ~ - 1, then 
the loan rate rt+l is an increasing function of bank concentration H measured by the 
art+l H erfindahl index : 
0 
H > 0. 
Proof See Appendix C. • 
The intuition of the proposition 2 is as follows. Under the convexity of the cost of 
innovation and the positivity of the Lerner index, an increase in the Herfindahl index 
increases the market power of banks and increases at the same time the loan rate for 
entrepreneurs. 
Using equations (1.12), (1.17), (1.18), ·and the implicit relation (1.19), we derive 
the equilibrium probability of entrepreneurial innovation f.tt+l according to the loan rate 
r't+l, the proximity to the world technology frontier at , and the Herfinda.hl index H , 
given by 5 
(1.20) 
5. See Appendix C. 
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The condition cp 2: 2 en ures that the probability of entrepreneurial innovation is 
strictly positive (J.Lt+l > 0) and less thau one (J.Lt+l < 1). 6 The following proposition 
shows that countries close to the world technology frontier have a higher probability to 
innova te. 
Proposition 3. If cp 2: 2, the pmbability of entrepreneurial innovation J.Lt+ l is an 
. ÔJ.Lt+l > 0 increasing function of the proximity ta the world technology fr-anti er at . âa1- . 
Proof See Appendix C. • 
In proposition 1, we have shown that countries closer to the technology frontier 
have lower loan rates through higher wages. The decr ased loan rates promote access 
to credit for innovators, increasing the probability of entrepreneurial innovation. An 
increase in the probability of entrepreneurial innovation has a po itive and significant 
effect on the productivity of the economy. 
The next proposition provides our fust prediction; lt implies that bank concen-
tration bas a negative direct effect on the probability of entrepreneurial innovation . 
2-1/J 
Proposition 4. If cp 2: 2 and rt+l < { w [T(1 - B) + (1 - I D)] ai} l-1/J ( *) ~ - 1, the 
probability of entreprenez•rial innovation is a decreasing function of the bank concentra-
. . ÔJ.Lt+l 
twn H m easured by the Herfindahl mdex : âH < O. 
Proof See Appendix C. 
• 
Proposition 4 is quite int uitive and cornes from proposition 2. The market power 
of banks increases loan rates, which reduces the amounts of loans for innovation, thereby 
decreasing the probability of entrepreneurial innovation. 
Finally, the following proposition i the most important prediction of our theore-
tical model. It shows that bank concentration has a negative and significant effect on 
6. See Appendix C. 
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the probability of entrepreneurial ümovation, and that this effect is increasingly nega-
tive as the country approaches the world technology frontier. This result is validated by 
empirical estimates using cross-country and panel data, which we present in section 3 
of the article. 
Proposition 5. If cp~ 2 and rt+l < {w [T(1- B) + (1 -1'D)] at} 1- <l> ( ~) 2- <1> ~ -1, then 
the bank concentration has a negative effect on economie growth for countries close to 
. cPJ.l.t+l 
the world technology jront2er: âHâat <O. 
Proof See Appendix C. • 
Combining propositions 3 and 4 gives us proposition 5. The intuition of propo-
sition 5 is as follows. The market power of banks by increasing the Herfindahl index 
has a negative effect on the probability of entrepreneurial innovation for a country close 
to the frontier. To our knowledge, this theoretical result is the first in the literature to 
establish the negative effect of bank concentration on growth through innovation for 
countries close to the world technology frontier. The raison d'être of thi finding is that 
countries close to the world technology frontier have more opportunities to innovate, 
whicb positively and increasingly affects economie growth. The increase of market po-
wer in the banking sector by the ri e in bank concentration leads to the reduction of 
the amounts allocated to innovators, resulting in the reduction of economie growth for 
these countries. 
1.2.3 Dynamics and bank concentration 
Substituting the expression of the probability of entrepreneurial innovation into 
the equation (1.10) allows us to find the dynamics of the proximity to the world tech-
nology frontier : 
(1.21) 
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where the equilibrium probability of entrepreneurial innovation is given by 
Proposition 6 shows that a given country reaches a unique and positive value of its 
proximity to the world technology frontier and that this equilibrium is stable. The 
steady, tate depends on the bank concentration of the country through t~e equilibrium 
probability to innovate as already suggested by propositions 4 and 5 
Proposition 6. If rp > 2, then : 
1. F(at;) is z-Lipschitzian and contracting, where z = (4>-2~~l+g) [ </>1/.> (r~-rr)r- 4> < 1. 
2. The pmximity to the world technology frontier of a given country converges in the 
long run to the unique steady-state value a*, where a* is given by 
Proof See Appendix D . 
a*= (1 + g) p,* < 1 
1-L* + g 
Main predictions : Our theoretical model predicts two implications : 
1. Bank concentration has a negative effect on economie growth; 
(1.22) 
• 
2. For countries close to the world technology frontier, bank concentration has a 
negative effect on economie gmwth. 
1.3 Bank concentration and convergence : Cross-country and panel evidence 
1.3.1 Specification and data 
In this section, we support om theoretical predictions with evidence. Our regres-
sion is specified as 
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J( 
Growthi,t = a+ (h CONCi,t + 5zCONCi,t x FRO Ti,t + ~,Bkxk ,i,t+ Çi +(t +Ei,t (1.23) 
k= l 
where i and t denote country and period · a, Çi, and (t denote respectively the intercept, 
country, and t ime fixed effects; and X i,t = [x l ,i,t, . .. , X K ,i.,t ] is a set of K control variables 
defined below. We therefore t est the link between growth and bank concentration using 
panel data for 125 countries over the period 1980-2010 where data are averaged over 
five 5-year periods between 1980 and 2010. 7 Growthi,t is the average per worker GDP 
growth rate over each 5-year period using per worker GDP data from Penn vVorld 
Table 7.1 (Aten et al., 2012). 8 The proximity of the country i to t he world t echnology 
frontier, defined as the maximum of initial per worker real GDP 's at the beginning of 
each sub-period , subsumed as at in the theoretical model and denoted FRONTi,t in our 
econometrie specification, is measured as the logarithm of the rat io of the initial per 
worker real GDP of country i over the 5-year period to the initial per work r real GDP 
of the United States. 9 
CO rc i,t is the bank concentration, which is equal to the . hare of assets of the 
7. The first period covers the years 1980-1985; the econd period covers the years 1986-1990 ; the 
third period covers the years 1991-1995 and so on. T he last period covers the years 2006-2010. 
8. We use RGDPWOJ< as a measure of real GDP. PWT 7.1 i. publicly avai lable a t 
https: 1 ! pwt. sas . upenn . edu/ . Our re. ults rem ain robust using RGDPCH, i.e. per capita GDP 
ins tead of per worker GDP. See Table 1.7 for more det ails . Vve also use the new Penn 
World Table 8 taken from Groningen Growt h and Development Center, publicly availa ble at 
htt p : 1 /www . rug . n1/resear ch/ ggdc/data /penn- world-table. For details see, Table 1.10 and 1.11. 
9. We do not put the proximity to t he worldwide technological frontier FRONT ;,t in om eco-
nometrie specifications beca.use we find a strong correlation equals to 0.93 between t he interaction 
term CONC;, tXFRO 1T; ,t and the proximi ty to the world teclmo logy front ier FRONT t, t , which lead 
to obvious m ult icollinearity problems. To treat this problem , we ·share our ample into two groups of 
countries, the first group is composed of countries a bove the medi an of the proximity to the world 
technology front ier , and the second gToup i composed of countr ies below. For details, see column (3) 
of Tab le 1.3. 
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three la.rgest banks in total ba.nking system a.ssets. 10 Its va.lue lies between 0 and 1, where 
0 indicates a low bank concentration and 1 indicates a. high bank concentration. Table 1.1 
presents the summary of the statistics. The average of bank concentration is 0.737, while 
the minimum and maximum are 0.151 and 1, respectively. The countries with a. high 
bank concentration over the period are Afghanistan, Angola, Alba.nia., Burundi , Benin , 
Botswana., Bulgaria , Ba.hrain, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia., Estonia., Gabon, 
Guyana, Madagascar, and Kyrgyzstan. The countries with a low bank concentration 
over the period are : Guatemala, Luxembourg, Japan , Korea, Russia, Taiwan, and the 
United States. We use a.s robustness checks another mea.sure of bank concentration 
(Herfindahl index), even if the sample size is much lower in Table 1.6. 
Table 1 .1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Growth 547 0.019 0.031 -0.073 0.1 29 
CONC 547 0.737 0.195 0.151 1 
FRONT 547 -1.708 1.239 -4.606 0.441 
M2 516 25.288 83.417 -26.669 1335.666 
PRIVCRED 535 60.624 49 .826 -61.054 306.973 
I IFL 511 26.816 134.947 -5.180 1667.207 
SCHOOL 478 27.880 22.532 0.398 104. 110 
BUDBAL 340 -1.297 5.575 -64.939 19.755 
GOVC 518 15.897 5.943 4.135 46.750 
TRADE 539 84.271 51.310 16.061 412.116 
Legal origin, which is a. set of three dummy variables, introduced by Laporta. et al. 
(1997, 1998, 2008) , indica.tes the country i legal system (English, French, or German). 11 
10. Concentrat ion measures, from Beek et al. (2010), are publicly available at 
http ://www.econ .brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/IndexLevine.htm. 
11. Legal origin dummies are from Laporta et al. (200 ), and their da.t~ et i publicly a.vallable at 
http: 1 /mba. tuck. dartmouth. edu/pages/facul ty /rafael . laporta/publications. html . We also use 
26 
Other control variables, from the World Bank vVDI , 12 arc used in om estima-
tions : school, private credit, macroeconomie policies (moncy growth, inflation rate, 
budget balance, government consumption, and trade) . School, measured by the total 
emollment in secondary education , regardless of age, is expressed as a perccntagc of the 
population of official secondary education age. Private credit provided by the banking 
sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exc ption of credit 
to the central government which is net. Private credit is our proxy for the fina.ncial 
development following Aghion et al. (2005) and Beek et al. (2000), who argue that pri-
vate credit is a good measure of financial development. Macroeconomie policies include 
money growth, an average annual growth rate in money; inflation, as measured by the 
consumer priee index, reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed 
at specified intervals, such as yearly, where the Laspeyres formula is generally used 13 ; 
budget balance as % of GDP as cash surplus or deficit i.· revenue (including grants) 
minus expense, minus net acquisition of non financial assets (in the 1986 GFS manual, 
non-financia.l a sets were included under revenue and expencliture in gross terms); go-
vemment cons~tmption (% of GDP) includes all current government expenditmes for 
purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees), and trade, cal-
culated as the sum of exports (%of GDP) and imports (%of GDP). 
t he legal origin as instrumental variab les for the cross-country regressions. 
12. The World Development Indlcator are publicly available at http: 1 /www . worldban.k. org/. 
13. Our results are robust through the use of inflation, as measured by t he annual gTowth rate of 
the GDP implicit defiator. For more information, see Table 1.8. 
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Table 1.2 shows the correlations among the variables. The statistics demonstrate 
that there are sorne important correlations among the variables. The average per worker 
GDP growth rate and private credit are negatively correlated with bank concentration. 
This suggests that less bank concentration may be better in providing financing. There 
is also a negative correlat ion between bank concentration and the technological frontier, 
and we find that the average per worker GDP growth rate is negatively correlated with 
the frontier, which indicate the convergence effects. Bank concentration is negatively 
correlated with school but positively correlated with government consumption and tra.de. 
1.3.2 Cross-country regression results 
Table 1.3 presents the results of cross-country regressions. We first r gress the 
average per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration. Bank concentration has a 
negative and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate at 5%, 
as per cohmm (1). In column (2), wc add the interaction variable equal to the product 
of bank concentration and the proximity to the world technology frontier, uch t hat 
(CONCxFRO T) as suggested by our t heoret ical madel. Bank concentration remain 
negative and significant a.t 1%, and t he interaction variable is significant and negative 
at 10%. This result implies that bank concentration bas a negative and significant effect 
on the average per worker GDP growth rate for countries close to the world technology 
frontier. In addit ion, we test the robustness of our results by addressing the issue of 
multicollinearity between the proximity to the world technology frontier (FRO TT) and 
the interaction term (CONCxFR.ONT) in column (3) . We divide our sample into two 
groups : countries above the median of proximity to the world technology frontier and 
those below. The first group represents countries doser to the world technology frontier , 
and the second represents countries farther away. Our goal is to eliminate the interaction 
variable in our regression; we then regress the average per worker GDP growth rate on 
bank concentration for the two country groups. We find tha.t countries above the median 
of proximity to the world technology frontier have a negative and significant coefficient, 
while countries below the median have a coefficient that is negative but insignificant. 
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Column ( 4) regresses the average per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration, 
the interaction variable, and legal origin dummies. Bank concentration has a negative 
and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate at 1%, and 
the interaction term (CONCxFRO T) is also negative and significant at 5%. Colwnns 
(5) , (6) , and (7), respectively, introduce the following control variables : financial deve-
lopment measured by private credit, school, and macroeconomie policies, which include 
money growth -12, inflation rate, budget balance, government con umption , and trade. 
Bank concentration has a negative and sig11ificant direct effect on the average per worker 
GDP growth rate at 1%, and the interaction tenn r mains respectively negative and 
significant at 5% and 1%. These results confirm the theoretical predictions , namely that 
bank concentration has a negative and significant direct effect on growth, especially for 
countries close to the world technology frontier. Column (8) regresses the average per 
worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration, the interaction tenn, and all control 
variables listed above, showing that bank concentration and the interaction tenn remain 
negative and significant at 1%. To treat a possible endogeneity of bank concentration, 
we introduce an estimation with the instrumental variables in column (9). Following 
Aghion et aL (2005), we use English, French, and German legal origins as instrumental 
variables and instrumenting bank concentration, and we use legal origins interacted with 
the proximity to the world technology front ier (FRONTxLEGOR) to instrument the 
interaction term (CONCxFRONT). We also include the following control variables : 
financial development , school, and macroeconomie policies. \li/e find that bank concen-
tration remains negative and significaJ1t at 5%, and the interaction term is also negative 
and significant at 1% ; these findings are con. istent with the predictions of our theoreti-
cal rnodel. However, Laporta et al. (2008) find that the legal origin is strongly correlated 
with so many economie variables, which are themselves strongly correlated with growth 
and therefore seem not to respect the exclusion restriction condition..'>. To remedy this 
deficiency, we present dynamic panel regressions based on the Arrellano-Bond GMM 
estimator (Arrellano and Bond, 1991) in the next section. 
T
ab
le
 
1.
3 
C
ro
ss
-
c
o
u
n
tr
y 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5
) 
(6)
 
(7
) 
(8)
 
(9
) 
co
 c
 
-
0.
01
7 
-
0.
02
4 
-
0.
02
8 
-
0.
02
1 
-
0.
02
5 
-
0.
03
4 
-
0.
03
4 
-
0.
05
4 
(0
.0
26
) 
(0
.
00
3)
 
(0
.
00
0)
 
(0
.0
08
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0.
00
1)
 
(0
.
00
0)
 
(0.
01
 )
 
C
O
 r
e
 x
 
F
R
O
 
T 
-
0.
00
2 
-
0.
00
4 
-
0.
00
5 
-
0.
00
7 
-
0.
00
3 
-
0.
00
9 
-
O.
O
ll
 
(0
.
06
7) 
(0
.
01
2) 
(0.
01
8) 
(0.
00
1) 
(0
.0
40
) 
(0.
00
1)
 
(0
.0
00
) 
co
 
C
l 
-
0.
01
8 
(0
.
04
2) 
co
 
C
2 
-
0.
17
8 
(0
.
17
1)
 
O
bs
e
rv
a
tio
n
s 
12
5 
12
5 
12
4 
12
4 
12
3 
12
3 
10
7 
10
6 
10
6 
Le
ga
l O
rig
in
s 
y e
s 
y e
s 
y e
s 
F 
in
a
n
c
ia
l D
ev
e
lo
pm
e
n
t 
y e
s 
y e
s 
y e
s 
Sc
ho
o
l 
y c
s 
y c
s 
y c
s 
1a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 P
o
lic
ie
s 
y e
s 
y e
s 
y e
s 
io
te
s 
: 
p-
va
lu
e 
a
re
 i
n 
pa
re
n
th
es
is,
 
a
li 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
in
cl
u
de
 a
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t.
 
D
e
pe
n
d 
v
a
ria
bl
e 
is 
th
e 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 p
er
 
w
o
rk
e
r 
G
D
P 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
 o
v
e
r 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 1
98
0-
20
10
, 
w
he
n 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
T
he
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 i
n 
co
lu
rn
n 
(1)
 is
 e
st
im
a
te
d 
u
sin
g 
O
LS
. 
T
he
 r
e
gr
es
si
o
n
 in
 c
o
lu
rn
n
 
(2)
 is
 
a
lso
 e
st
im
a
te
d 
u
si
ng
 O
LS
 a
n
d 
a
dd
s 
th
e 
in
te
ra
c
tio
n
 
te
rr
n
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
ba
n
k 
co
n
 ·
e
n
tr
a
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
pr
o
x
ir
ni
ty
 t
o 
th
e 
w
o
rld
w
id
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l 
fro
n
tie
r.
 
Co
lu
m
n 
(3)
 c
o
n
ta
in
s 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
a
bo
ve
 a
n
d 
be
lo
w
 
th
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
pr
ox
im
it
y 
to
 t
he
 
w
o
rld
 t
ec
hn
o
lo
gy
 
fro
n
tie
r
.
 
T
he
 r
e
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
in
 c
o
lu
m
n
s 
(<1)
,
 
(5
), 
(6)
 a
n
d 
(7)
 a
dd
 r
cs
pe
c
tiv
el
y 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
n
tr
o
ls 
: 
Le
ga
l O
ri
gi
ns
 (B
rit
is
h,
 
Fr
e
n
c
h 
a
n
d 
G
e
rm
a
n
), 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
D
ev
el
op
m
e
n
L,
 
Sc
ho
o
l 
a
n
d 
M
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
lc
 P
o
lic
ie
s 
(In
fla
tio
n
 
ra
te
, 
M
o
n
cy
 g
1·o
w
tb
,
 
Tr
ac
le
, 
G
ov
er
n
m
e
n
t 
Co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 
a
n
d 
B
ud
ge
t 
B
a
la
n
ce
). 
T
he
 r
e
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
in
 c
o
lw
n
n
s 
( )
 a
n
d 
(9
) i
nc
lu
de
 a
il 
·
o
n
Lr
o
l v
a
ri
a
bl
es
,
 
w
he
re
 O
LS
 is
 u
se
d 
in
 
co
lu
m
n 
(7
) a
n
d 
N
 
is 
u
se
d 
in
 c
o
lu
m
n 
(9)
 w
ith
 t
he
 in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
 :
 (L
eg
al
 o
ri
gi
ns
 a
n
d 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
bl
e 
: 
F
R
O
 
T
x
LE
G
O
R
). 
31 
1.3.3 P anel results 
In this section, we verify the predictions using panel data. The r sults are pre-
sented in Table 1.4 without control variables and in Table 1.5 with control variables. 
We therefore regress the average per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration. 
Column (1) uses OLS, column (2) introduces the country fixed effects and column (3) 
uses country and period fixed effects. Bank concentration has a negative sign but is 
not significant for all three methods listed above. These results are robust with the in-
troduction of the control variables : financial development, school, and macroeconomie 
policies. In the second step, we introduce the interaction term betvveen bank concen-
tration and the proximity to the world technology frontier (CONC x FRONT). Using 
OLS in column (5), bank concentration has a negative and significant direct effect on 
the average per worker GDP growth GDP at 5%, but the interaction term rema.ins ne-
gative and is not significant. In column ( 6) , we use country fixed effects, and find th at 
the variable bank concentration remains negative and significant at 1% and that the 
interaction term is also negative and sig11ificant at 1%. The country and period fixed 
effect are introduced in column (7) , and bank concentration and the interaction term 
are negative and significant at 1%. These results confirm our theoretical predictions and 
empirical cross-country results. Bank concentration has a negative and significant direct 
effect on the average per worker GDP gTowth rate, and this effect is even more negative 
and significant when the country is close to the world technology frontier. 
We introduce control variables in Table 1.5. In column (1), we regress the average 
per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration and the interaction term, controlling 
for school. Using OLS in column (1), bank concentration has a negative and significant 
direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate at 5% and the interaction tenn 
is negative and significant at 5%. In column (2) , we introduce the country fixed effects, 
and see that bank concentration and the interaction tenu remain negative and significant 
at 1%. Column (3) introduces country and period fixed effects; bank concentration 
has a negative and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth 
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Table 1.4 Panel regressions without control variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONC -0.009 -0.019 -0.017 0.008 -0.017 -0.060 -0.079 -0.083 
(0.179) (0.135) (0.230) (0.694) (0.030) (0.001) (0.000) (0 .001) 
CONC x FRONT -0.003 -0.020 -0.032 -0.053 
(0.101) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 547 547 547 247 547 547 547 247 
Country dummies y es y es y es yes 
Year dummies y es y es 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, a il regressions include a constant. Depend variable is the average per worker 
GDP growtb rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. The regressions in columns (1) and (5) are estimated 
using OLS, columns (2) and (6) include countries fixed effects, cohunn (3) and (7) include both countries and 
periods fixed effects and (4) and (8) are estimated with the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimator (Arrellano and 
Bond, 1991). 
at 1%, and the interaction tenn remains negative and significant at 1%. Controlling 
for school, our empirical restùts are robust and at same time validate our theoretical 
predictions. The control variable financial development is introduced in columns (5), 
(6) and (7) . We find that bank concentration is respectively negative and significant at 
1% and 5%, using OLS, country fixed effects, and country and period fixed effect. The 
interaction term is negative and insignifica.nt using OLS, but it is significa.nt at 1% when 
we include country, and period fixed effects. In columns (9), (10), and (11), we control 
for macroeconomie policies, and bank concentration is negative and significant a.t 5%, 
but the interaction term is not significant using OLS. Column (10) introduces country 
fixed effects, and shows that bank concentration ha.s a negative and significant direct 
effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate at 1%, and that the interaction term 
is negative and significant at 1%. The country and period fixed effects are introduced in 
column (11). We find that bank concentration and the interaction term are negative and 
significant a.t 1%. Therefore, our theoretica.l pr dictions are robust with the introduction 
of various control variables; we show in the next section that results are also robust using 
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other estimations methods, as well as sorne other measures of our interest variable that 
is, bank concentration, other measure of inflation, and per capita GDP in tead of per 
vwrker GDP in Tables 1.6, 1. 7, and 1.8. 
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1.3.4 Robustness ch cks 
To remedy the problems of the legal origin in the estimation by the IV method in 
t he cross-country section, we use the Arrellano et al. (1991) GMM estimation method. 
The results are presented in columns (4) and (8) of Table 1.4 and in columns (4), (8), 
and (12) of Table 1.5 . Regressing only the average per worker GDP growth rate on 
bank concentration , the Arrellano-Bond GMM method show that bank concentration 
has a posit ive and insignificant effect on growth GDP rate, as shown in column (4) 
of Table 1.4. Column (8) introduces the interaction term ; bank concentration and the 
interaction tenn are negative and significant at 1%, as shown in column (8) of Table 1.4. 
Controlling for school, financial development, and macroeconomie policies, we find that 
bank concentration exerts respectively a negative and significant direct effect on t he 
average per worker GDP growth rate at 1% and 5%, and the interaction tenu remain 
negative and sig11ificant at 1%, a'3 shown in columns (4), (8), and (12) of Table 1.5 . In 
summary, bank co.qcentration has a negative and significant direct effect on the average 
per worker GDP growth rate, and this effect is even more negative and significant when 
the country is close to t he world technology frontier. 
'vVe also use another variable to measure bank concentration : the Herfindahl in-
dex as defined in the theoretical section of our model. However, the size of t he sample is 
smaller than in the first case ; we have 70 observations in the cross-country regression , 
and there is not enough variability within countries to use this measure in the panel 
regressions. The results are presented in Table 1.6. The first column (1) regresses the 
average per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration with the OLS method, and 
bank concentration exerts a negative but insignificant effect on the average per worker 
GDP grO\vth rate. In column (2), we add the interaction term between bank concen-
t ration a.nd the proximity to the world technology frontier. The coefficient associated 
with bank concentration is negative and significant at 10%, while t he interaction term 
remains negative and insignificant but becomes significant when we introduce control 
variables (legal origin, column (3) ; financial development, column ( 4) ; and school, co-
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lumn (5)). Bank concentration has a negative and significant direct e.ffect at 5% on the 
average per worker growth GDP rate, and the interaction t enu has a negative and si-
gnificant e.ffect at 10% with legal origin, and financial development, a.nd 5% wi th school. 
Column (7) regresses the average per \•.rorker GDP growth rate on bank concentration, 
the interaction term, and the set of ali control variables . Bank concentration has a ne-
gative and significant direct effect at 1% on the average per worker GDP growth rate, 
a.nd t his e.ffect is even more negative when the country is close to the world t echnology 
frontier because the interaction term is negative and significant at 5%. IV est imation is 
performed in column (8) and confirms t he robustness ·of our main results because bank 
concentration and the interact ion term rem ain negative and significant at 1%. 
Table 1.6 Cross-colmtry regres ions using Herfinda.hl Index 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HERF -0.018 -0.032 -0 .043 -0.031 -0.034 -0.049 -0.050 
(0.152) (0.066) (0.022) (0.049) (0.020) (0.014) (0.006) 
HERF x FRONT -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.016 
(0.246) (0.087) (0.085) (0.013) (0.219) (0.027) 
0 bservations 70 70 70 70 69 63 62 
Legal Origins y es y es 
Financia.l Developmen t y es y es 
School y es y es 
:tvlacroeconom.ic Pol.icies y es y es 
(8) 
-0.107 
(0.005) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
62 
y es 
y es 
y es 
y es 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, all regressions include a constant . Depend variable is t he average per worker 
GDP growth rate over t he period 1980-2010, when available. The regre sion in column (1 ) is estimated using OLS. 
T he regression in column (2) is also est imated using OLS and adds the interaction between bank concentration and 
proximity to the worldwide technologi cal frontier . T he regressions in colurnns (3), (4) , (5) and (6) add respectively t he 
following controls : Legal Origins (British, French and German) , Fina.ncia.l Development , School and Macroeconomie 
Policies (Inflation ra te, Money growt h, Trade, Government Consump tion and Budget Balance) . T he regres ions in 
columns (7) and (8) include ail control variables, where OLS i u ed in column (7) and IV is used in column (8) witb 
the instruments : (Legal origins and t he variable: FRO NT x LEGOR). 
In Tabl 1. 7, we test the robustness of our t heoretica.l implications and empirical 
37 
results using the average per capita GDP gTowth rate in pa:nel data. Bank concentration 
exerts a negative and insignificant effect on the average per capita GDP growth rate, as 
shown in column (1) with OLS, column (2) use. country fixed effects, column (3) adds 
cotmtry, and period fixed effects, and column (4) uses Arrellano-Bond GMM estimation. 
The introduction of the interaction term implies t hat bank concentration has a negative 
and significant direct effect at 5% with OLS , and 1% with country fi xed effects, coun-
try and period fixed effects and Arrellano-Bond GMM estimation. The interaction term 
rema.ins negative and significant at 1% except for the OLS method , columns (5)-(8). 
Therefore, using the average per capita GDP grmvth rate, we confirm the results obtai-
ned using per worker GDP growth rate in Table 4 and at the same time our theoretical 
predictions. 
Table 1. 7 Panel regressions without control variables using the average per ca.pita GDP 
growth rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
co c -0.008 -0.017 -0.011 0.016 -0.020 -0.059 -0.076 -0.053 
(0.230) (0.166) (0.450) (0.442) (0.013) (0.000) (0 .001 ) (0.031) 
CONC x FRONT -0.004 -0.021 -0.027 -0.034 
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 548 548 548 248 548 548 548 248 
Country dummies y es y es y es y es 
Year dummies y es y es 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, ail regres ·ions include a constant . Depend variable is the average per capita 
GDP growtb rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. The regressions in columns (1) and (5) are estimated 
using OLS, columns (2) and (6) include countries fixed effects, columns (3) and (7) include both countries and 
periods fixed effects and (4) and (8) are estimated with the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimator (Arrellano and 
Bond, 1991). 
\Ve do this same exercise by changing the measure of inflation with the annual 
growth rate of t he GDP implicit defiator. The cross-country re. ults are presented in 
columns (1)-(3) of Table 1.8, and the panel results are given in columns ( 4)-(7) of Table 
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1.8. The regression of the aver age per worker GDP growth rate on bank concentration, 
the interaction term, and the control vaJ.·iables show that bank concentration has a 
negative and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate and 
that this effect is even more negative and ignificant when the country is close to the 
world technology frontier. 
Table 1.8 Cross-country and panel regressions using inflation measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CONC -0.032 -0 .032 -0.042 -0.023 -0.098 -0.102 -0.0 0 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.073) (0.032) (0.000) (0.002) (0 .012) 
CONC x FRONT -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 -0.039 -0.047 -0.053 
(0.096) (0.003) (0.000) (0.212) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 10 107 107 321 321 321 145 
Country clummies y es y es 
Year cl ummies y es 
Legal Origins y es y es 
Financial Development y es y es 
School y es y es 
Macroeconomie Policies yes y es y es y es y es y es y es 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, ali regressions include a constant. Depend variable is the average 
per worker GDP growth rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. The regres ion in column (1) is 
estimated using OLS and add Maeroeeonornic policies. The regression in colurnn (2) is also estirnated using 
OLS and a.dds respectively the following controls : Legal Origins (British, French and German) , Financia.l 
Development, School and Macroeconomie Policies (Inflation rate, Moneta1·y growth, 'n·ade, Govenunent 
Consumption and Budget Balance). The IV is u ed in column (3) with the instruments : (Legal origin and 
the variable: FRONTxLEGOR). The colUlims (4)-(5)-(6)-(7) include the Macroeconomie policies variables 
(Inflation rate, Money growth, 'Il·ade, Government Consumption and Budget Balance) with country and 
year dummies. The column (7) uses the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimator (An·ellano and Bond, 1991 ). 
In our specifications , we incl ude bank regulation variables ( activity restriction, 
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required reserves, bank development , and official superyj ory power) 14 by following 
Beek et al. (2004). The results are presented in columns (2)-(5) of Table 1.9. The se-
cond column introduces entry into the banking requirements variable; the coefficients 
associated with bank concentration and the interaction variable is negative and si-
gnificant at 5% and 10%, respectively. Column 3 controls for the interaction variable 
(CONCxREST), where REST is an indicator of a bank's ability to engage in business 
of securities underwriting, insura.nce underwriting and selling, and in real estate invest-
ment , management, and development. Bank concentration has a negative and significa.nt 
direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate at 10% and the interaction 
variable (CO ICx FRONT) is negative, and significant a.t 10%. The interaction variable 
(CONCxSUP), where SUP inclicates official supervisory pmver, is introduced in column 
4; bank concentration and the interaction variable (CONCxFRONT) are negative and 
sig11ificant at 5% and 10%,respectively. Column 5 regTesses the average per worker GDP 
growth rate on bank concentration and the interaction variable (CO CxFRONT) and 
controlling for (CO CxBAI KDEV), where BANKDEV indicates bank development 
and is measmed as the ratio of bank credit to private firms as a sha.re of GDP, bank 
concentration and the interaction tenu (CO C x FRONT) ; are respect ively negative 
and significant a.t 1%, and 5%. We show that bank concentration has a negative and 
significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate and that this effect 
is even more negative when the country is close to the worldwide technological frontier 
a.fter having controlled for bank restriction variables. Bank effi.ciency control variables 
are introduced in columns ( 6) and (7). Indeed, wc use net intere t mar gin as a fT action 
of total interest earning assets and overhead costs as a share of total assets. Adding ove-
rhead costs, bank concentration and the interaction term romain negative and significant 
at 5% and 1% respectively, as per column 6. Column 7 regre ses the average per wor-
ker GDP growth rate on bank concentration and interaction term (CO CxFRO T); 
controlling for net interest mm·gin, we find that bank concentration and the interac-
14. Bank restriction and bank efficiency data, from Levine et al. (2007) and Levine et al. (2008) , 
Sm·vey of Bank Regulation and Supervision, publicly avallable at econ . worldbank. org 
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tion term exert a negative and significant effect on growth at 5%. Controlling for bank 
efficiency, our theoretical predictions and empirical results remain robust. 
Table 1.9 Cross-country using bank control variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
CONC -0.026 -0.023 -0.023 
(0.002) (0.035) (0.084) 
CONC x FRONT -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.067) (0.089) (0.098) 
(4) (5) 
-0.025 -0.031 
(0.027) (0.009) 
-0.005 -0.004 
(0.060) (0.063) 
(6) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
(7) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
Observations 125 69 68 68 66 64 64 
Req uired reserves y es 
Activity restrictions y es 
Official Supervi ory Power y es 
Bank development y es 
Overhead costs y es 
Net interest margin y es 
1 otes : p-value are in parenthesis, ail regre..c;sions include a constant. Depend variable is t he average per worker 
GDP growth rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. The regression in column (1) is estimated using 
OLS. The regression in column (2)-(3)-(4)-(5) is al o estimated using OLS and adds respectively the following 
contrais : Entry into banking requirements, (CONCxREST), (CONCxSUP) and (CONCxBANKDEV). Bank 
efficiency control variables are introduced in column (6) and (7). Column (6) adds overhead costs and column (7) 
adds net interest margin . 
In Tables 1.10 and l.ll , 15 we perform our theoretical and empirical result by 
using the new Penn World Table (PWT 8.0) following Feenstra et al. (2013). They 
make three major changes to PWT. The first change measures relative priees of exports 
and imports . The second change depends on the estimation of PPPs, over time which 
has important implications on cross-country economie growth, and the third change 
15 . Our res ults remain robu. t when using the new Penn World Tab le .0 and including contra is 
such as financial development, school, and macroeconomie policies (money growth, inflation rate , budget 
balance, government consumpt ion, and tr·ade) . These addit ional results can be obtained from the au thors 
upon request. 
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deals with the measures of capital stock and total factor productivity. These changes 
take into account the estimations of models that use the proximity (inverse measure 
of the distance) to the technological frontier. We regress the average per worker GDP 
growth rate on bank concentration in columns (1)- (3) u ing the OLS method, country 
dummies, and country and period fixed dummies respectively. Bank concentration re-
mains negative and significant. Columns (4)-(6) add the interaction t erm and use OLS , 
country dummies , and country and period fi.xed dummies; bank concentration exerts a 
negative and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP growth rate while 
the interaction remains negative and significant. 
Table 1.10 Panel regressions using Penn-\iVorld Table 8 and the average per worker 
GDP growth rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
co c -0.020 -0.034 -0.034 -0.030 -0.071 -0.080 
(0.001) (0 .015) (0.025) (0 .003) (0 .004) (0.002-) 
co C x FRONT -0.004 -0.018 -0 .026 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.009) 
Observations 518 518 518 517 517 517 
Country dummies y es y es y es y es 
Year dummies y es ye 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, aU regressions include a constant. Depend varia ble 
is t he average per worker GDP growth rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. 
The regressions in columns (1), (2), (3) show the results with the Panel da ta by using 
OLS method and adding countries fixed effects, and countries and period fixed etfects, 
respectively. The regressions in columns (4) , (5) and (6) include the interaction term of 
t he Panel data. 
vVe also use the average per capita GDP growth rate in Table 1.11. Bank concen-
tration, the interaction term between bank concentration, and the proximity to the tech-
nology frontier remain negative and significant. By using the new Penn World Table 8.0, 
we show that bank concentration has a negative and significant direct effect on growth 
rate and that this effect is even more negative and significant for countries close to the 
42 
world technology frontier . These findings confirm our theoretical and empirical results 
and validate at the same the robustness of our results . 
Table 1.11 P anel regressions using Penn-World Table 8 and the average per capita 
GDP growth rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONC -0.016 -0.030 -0.024 -0.025 -0.068 -0.084 
(0. 025) (0.061) (0. 152) (0. 003) (0.017) (0.004) 
co C x FRONT -0.003 -0.016 -0.031 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.003) 
Ob. ervations 518 518 51 517 517 517 
Country dummies y es y es y es y es 
Year dummies y es y es 
Notes : p-value are in parenthesis, all regre ions include a constant. Depend variable 
is the average per capita GDP gTov.rth rate over the period 1980-2010, when available. 
The regressions in colunms (1) , (2) , (3) show th e results with the Panel dat a by using 
OLS method and aclding countries fixed effects, and countries and period fixed effects, 
respectively. The regressions in columns (4) , (5) and (6) inclucle the interaction term of 
the Panel data. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The effects of bank concentration on economie development have previously been 
studied in the literature. However , these works focus on the empirical studies, and the 
rcsults are ambiguous and unclear. In this article, we employed a theoretical and empi-
rical framework to study the role played by the banking market structure in economie 
growth. Our theoretical madel uses Schumpeterian endogenous growth following Aghion 
et al. (2005) and the Cournot imperfect banking competition. 
We theoretically show tha.t bank concentration exerts a direct negative effect on 
economie growth. For countries close to the world technology frontier bank concentra-
t ion has a negative effect on economie growt h. To verify and validate our theoretical 
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predictions , we use econometrie specification regre sing the average per worker GDP 
growth rate on bank concentration and the interaction term between bank concentra-
tion and the proximity to the world technology frontier using cross-count ry and panel 
data over the period 1980-2010 for 125 countries. Our empirical results show that bank 
concentration has a negative and significant direct effect on the average per worker GDP 
growth rate, which is even more negative and significant when the country is close to 
the worldwide technological frontier. These results are robust to the use of different 
measures of bank concentration, to the introduction of the following control variables : 
school, financial development , legal origins (British, French, and German), macroeco-
nomie policies (money growth inflation, budget balance government consumption, and 
trade) , bank regulation (activity restriction, required reserves, bank development and 
official supervisory power) and bank efficiency (net interest margin, and overhead costs) 
as well as, to the use of multiple estimation methods : OLS, IV, and Arrellano-Bond 
G MM estimation. 
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Appendix A : Demand for loans 
Case of cp> 2. The demand for loans is given by : 
(1.24) 
vVhere Tt+l is the amount borrowed from the bank, Zt+1 is the total inve. tment 
in tenns of the final good, Wt is wages and r D,t the return rate. We first derive this 
demand for loans with respect to loan rate rt+l : 
(1.25) 
then, multiplying by rt+l, we ob tain : 
~~::: rt+l = ( cp_ ~ )rt+l ( </J7/J; t+l ) ~~ 1 At+l (1.26) 
and finally, we derive the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for loans as : 
1 Tt+l _ cp- 1 w(cp- 1)(1 + rv ,t)rt+l 
-==--- - -- - 1 at 
8Tt+l "" ( ) -'P 7r </> - 1 
-8--rt+I 1r -Tt+l </n/Jrt+l 
(1.27) 
€ 
where w = 1 ~9 . The inverse of the elasticity of the demand depends on cp , the 
parameter that captures the curvature of the cost of innovation; a share of wages and 
profits, w and 1f ; r D,t, depo it rate; rt+l, loa.n rate; and at , the proximity to the world 
technology frontier. 
Ca e of <P = 2. vVe derive the demand for loans with respect to loan rt+1 
8Tt+1 = -~At+1 
art+l 7/Jrt+ l 
then , multiplying by rt+l, we obtain : 
âTt+l 1f2 -
--rt+l = ---At+l 
Brt+l 7/Jrl+l 
and finally we derive the inver e of the elasticity of the demand for ]oans as : 
1 
E 
Appendix B : Lerner Index 
Case of</>> 2. Recall that , first order conditions of a given bank is written a 
{ 
Hr~+l Tt+l f.lt+l + rt+lf.lt+l = T + ~(T (FOC) 
·rD ,t+ l = rD = 7(1 - B) - 'YD 
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(1.28) 
(1.29) 
The first line allows us to find the loan rate according to the elasticity of the demand 
for loan.· : 
o that dividing by 1't+lf.lt+l, we obtain the Lerner index expression : 
rt+lf.lt+l - ( T + 'YT) H 
rt+l f.lt+l E 
(1.30) 
where the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for loans is determined by : 
1 _ </>- 1 w(</J- 1)(1 + rD,t)rt+l _ </>- 1 r 1-:-ï 
- - -,~..- - _ 1_ at - -,~..- - atrt+1 
E 'f' ( 1T ) c/>- 1 <f' 
7r rj>'IJ; rt+ 1 
(1.31) 
with r = w(<i>-l)(r( l-B1_2l -"l'D)). Therefore, the Lerner index is positive if <~>; 1 - ratrt!! > 7r (.E_) <1>- 1 . 
<I>.P 
<l>- 1 
0 . ( d>-1 )~ , Le. rt+l < ~rat . 
Case of</>= 2. The Lerner index is given by : 
i/J (T + 'YT) H 1 - =-
7r E 
(1.32) 
where the inverse of the elasticity of the demand for loans is determined by : 
1 1 [T(1- B) + (1- 'YD)] wi/J 2 
- = -2 - 2 r t+ 1 at E 7r (1.33) 
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Appendix C : Proof of Propositions 1 to 4 
Case of cp > 2. In order to prove Propositions 1 to 4, we have to establish the implicit 
relation between the loan rate rt+l , the proximity to the worldwide technological fTontier 
at , I{erfindahl index H and the probability to innovate f.J,t+l· First , we rewrite the 
expressi~n of rt+lf.J,t+l using equation (1.12) such that : 
(1.34) 
1 
where n :::::: ( ;7/1 ) <P- l . Then, substituting equation (1.31) and equation (1.34) into the 
equation (1.30) , we get : 
1- (T+ / r) . ;=f _1:_r ( cp-1 _ r <P~ l) n rt+l - 7. rp atrt+l (1.35) 
Finally, rewriting equation (1.35) allows us to find the implicit relation between the loan 
rate Tt+l and the proximity to the worldwide technological frontier at : 
2-<P ~ 
G(rt+l, at) = xrl:;I - Hrat'r/'.;I - p = 0 (1.36) 
where p = 1 - H(~- l) and x= (T~·.··IT) . 
Case of rp = 2. We rewrite the Lerner index substituting equation (1.33) into the 
equation (1.32). 
1 '1/J (T+/r) -H(1 [T(1-8)+(1- 'YD)]w'l/J 2 ) 
- - -2 - ') r t+ 1 at 
7ï 7ï-
and finally the equilibrium loan rate is obtained as : 
(1.37) 
Proof of Proposition 1. If the cast of innovation is convex, and the Lerner index is 
positive, the implication for propo ·ition 1 is tha.t countries close to the world technology 
ft·ontier have higher wages, implying that the entrepreneurs in the innovation sector are 
self-financing a significant amount of their project and therefore paying a smaller amount 
to the bank. 
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Case of <P > 2. The implicit function theorem implies directly that : 
ôG(rt+l, at) 
ôrt+l ô at < 0 ô at ôG(rt+l, at) (1.38) 
Ôrt+l 
Case of <P = 2. To prove Proposition 1 for <P = 2, we differentiate the equilibrium 
loan rate given by equation (1.37) with respect to the proximity to the worldwide 
technological frontier at : 
(1.39) 
4w'lj; [T(l- B) + (1- / D)] at 
• 
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the convexity of the cost of innovation and the positivity 
of the Lerner index, an increase in the Herfindahl index increases the market power of 
banks and increases at the same time the loan rate for entrepreneurs. 
Case of <P > 2. The implicit function theorem implies directly that : 
Ôrt+l 
ôH 
ôG(rt+l, at) 
-;::-:;:;;-;-ô=H=----~ > o 
ôG(rt+l, at) 
Ôrt+l 
(1.40) 
ôG(rt+l at) _ ( <t>-l r . <t>~ 1 ) 
since ôH - T - atrt+l > 0 (by positivity of the Lerner index) and 
ÔG( ) 
( 
~ 1 ) Tt+l, CLt _ 2-ci> tf>- 1 Hep .P-1 . . 
8 - ,p- 1Xrt+1 - <P-l fa trt+l < 0 1f <P > 2. rt+l 
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Case of cp= 2. To provo the Proposition 1 for cp= 2, we differentiate the equilibrium 
loan rate given by equation (1.37) with respect to the Herfindahl index H : 
1f [1 - 1/J (T~')'; ) ] ôrt+l .. 
ôH ------------~------~==7=~~~>0 ( 1.41) 
• 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Case of rp > 2. We first derive the expression of the equilibrium probability to innovate 
and establish its properties and give a proof of proposition 2. Substituting equation 
(1.31) into equation (1.30) we get the following expression for the loan rate : 
(T + /'T) (1.42) 
which we substitute into equation (1.12) to obtain the equilibrium probability to inno-
vate: 
(1.43) 
The probability of entrepreneurial innovation is positive and less than one if cp > 2, 
& 0 
since c/>; l > rGq;r/+11 (by positivity of the Lerner index) and since ratrt;11 > c/>; l - ft· 
In proposition 1, we have shown that countries doser to the technology frontier 
have lower loan rates through higher wages. The decreased loan rates promote access 
to credit for innovators, increasing the probability of entrepreneurial innovation. An 
increase in the probability of entrepreneurial innovation has a positive and significant 
effect on the productivity of the economy. In arder to prove the Proposition 3, we 
differentiate equation (1.43) to obtain : 
8~:: 1 = rp ~ 2 ( ~ [ 1- H ( rp; 1 - ra.trt1;) J) ~ 
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S. l d.. 2 d 0 af.Lt+l 0 'f ( </>~ 1 </> art+ l <1>::1) mee we assume t1at '+' > an J.tt+l > , -a-- > 1 rt+l + G.t ,p_ 1-a--rt+1 G.t G.t 
Substituting the expression of aart+l given by (1.38), we get : 
> o. 
G.t 
Case of cf; = 2. We first derive the expression of the equilibrium probability to t he 
entrepreneurial innovation. We substitute equation (1.37) into equation (1.12) to obtain 
the probability to innovate : 
2w [7(1- e) + (1- /D)] 
1/J { 1 - fJ ( 1 - 1/!(T:/z ))} G.t (1.45) 
To prove the Proposition 2 for cf;= 2 we differentiate equation (1.45) such that : 
W [7(1- B) + (1- / D)] -------'----'-------'----"-----'-~'-----------:- > 0 
-----...---'--''---T-'--'-~~ a, } l (1.46) 
• 
Proof of Propo ition 4. It shows that the market power of banks increases loan rates, 
which reduces the amounts of loans for innovation, thereby decreasing the probability 
of entrepreneurial innovation. 
Case of cf; > 2. To prove Proposition 3, we use the equilibrium probability of innovation , 
given by equation (1.43). Differentiating this equation with respect Herfindahl index H , 
we get: 
Since we assume that cf; > 2 a.nd f.L t+ l > 0, ~7/ < 0 if <t>;l - fa.trt'_;11 a ( ....L ) > O. This 
tl. 
condition implies that: rt+ l < ( $ra~) "' (positivity of the Lerner index) . 
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Case of r/J = 2. To prove Proposition 3 for r/J = 2, we use the equilibriurn probability to 
innovate given by (1.45) . Differentiating this equation wit h respect to Herfindahl index 
H , we get : 
(1.48) 
• 
Proof of Proposition 5. The intuition of proposition 5 is as follows. The market power 
of banks by increasing the Herfindahl index has a negative effect on the probability 
of entrepreneurial innovation for a country close to the frontier. Since we assume that 
cp 2: 2 and ( <t>; l - I'atrt111 ) > 0 (by positively of the Lerner index). Proposition 3 and 
Propo ition 4 allows us to find Proposition 5 given by : 
• 
éP J-Lt+l < 0 8H8at 
Appendix D : Dynamics studies 
The technology gap is given by : 
where 
( 1.49) 
(1.50) 
First of ail we evalua.te the function F a.t the origin (i.e. at = 0) and at the worldwide 
technologica.l frontier (i .e. at= 1). For <P = 2, F(O) = 0, but F(O) > 0 if <P > 2 : 
{ 
1 
_ 1r H (4>-l) 4>-2 . 
F(O) = p,(O) - [ 1>1/J.(T+"fT) ( 1 - - ({'-. - )] > 0 lf r/J > 2 
p,(O) = 0 1f <P = 2 
(1.51) 
51 
At the worldwide technological frontier, we have (recall t hat p, is a probability and 
therefore is between 0 and 1 as shm~m in t he main text) : 
F(l) = p,(l) + -. 1-(1 - t.t( l)) = gp,(l) + 1 < 1 
l+g l+g (1.52) 
where 
p,(l ) = 
From Proposit ion 3, we already know that F(at) is an increasing function of the proxi-
mity to the worldwide technological front ier at and F(at) is concave because the pro-
bability of ent repreneurial innovation is concave as welL Finally, to assure convergence 
to a positive value of the steady state of t he proximity to the worldwide technological 
frontier for the case cjJ = 2, we show that the slope at the origin is greater t hau 1. Indeed , 
the value of the derivative of the function F at the origin is·given by : 
F' (O) = p,'(O) + - 1-(1- p,(O)) l+g (1.53) 
where equation (1.46) , for the case cjJ = 2, shows that the derivative of the equilibrium 
probability to innovate at the origin tends to infinity wa.rra.nting t ha.t F' (0) > 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. At steady state a* = F(a*), where a* E [0, 1] . If cp > 2, using 
the fixed point theorem, we show tha.t : 
1. F(a) is z-Lipschitzia.n, t herefore contra.cting, and 
2. F(a) converges to the unique steady sta.te value a* 
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F(a) is contracting if: IIF(l)- F(O)II ::::; zll l- Oll = z. Replacing the expressions of F(l) 
and F(O) , we get : 
IIF(l )- F(O)II = IIJ-L(l ) + 1 ~ g (1 - J-L( l ))- J-L(O)II 
= llgJ-L(l ) + _ l_- J-L(o)ll 
l+g l + g 
1 
= 1 + g llgJ-L(l)- (1 + g)J-L(O) +Ill 
1 { [ ( c/>- 1 <1> )]} "":_2 [ ( H(c/>- 1))] <1>:_2 
= 1 + g g "' 1 - H -cP- - fr(l) <~>-1 - (1 + g) "' 1 cP + 1 
'> ~:: llg { [1 - 4>~2 (1>; 1- rr(1 )~)]}- (1+ g) [ (1 - 1> ~ 21; 1)] + 111 
= (ifJ-2~1+g)"' <~> :.2 11grr(1) <~>~1- cp; 111 
H 1 
< K, <l> -2 (1 54) 
- (c/J- 2)(1 + g) .. 
where"' = </J'I/1(;'+-tz). Therefore, because the Lerner index is positive, F(a) is z-Lipsch.i tzian, 
1 . 
with z = ( .P-2~l+g) n, <l>- 2 , and F is contracting and the steady state value a* is unique . 
• 
CHAPTER II 
BAI KI G REFORMS, DISTA TCE TO FRO TIER AND GROvVTH : 
THEORY A D EVIDENCE 
Abstract 
\lYe theoretically and empirically analyze the effects of banking reforms on growth 
according to the level of technological development of a country. Using a Schumpeterian 
growth paradigm and monopolistic competition between differentiated products of the 
banking system, wc show that there is a threshold of technological development from 
·which banking reforms exert a positive effect on economie gTowth. To validate our 
theoretical predictions we use cross-country and panel estimates over the period 1980-
2010 for 78 countries . We find that ban.ldng reforms enhance the average per-worker 
GDP growth for countries close to the world technology frontier. 
KEYWORDS : Schumpeterian Growth, banking reforms, technological frontier, 
a.ppropriate institutions. 
JEL : 03, 016, G21 , C21 , C23. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The effects of banking reforms on fina.ncial stability and economie growth have 
lately been the subject of numerous scientific studies. Since the mid-1980s, internatio-
nal organization , namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have 
been encouraging emergent and developing countries to reform their banking systems 
to increase economie growth and reduce inequality. Empirically, the results obtained in 
studies measuring the connections between financialliberalization and economie growth 
have been disputed for many years among researchers (Henry (2007), Kose et al. (2009), 
a.mong otl1ers). Townsend and Ueda (2010) analyze the welfare gains from financial libe-
ralization using a tractable growth model with a financial sector and empirical simula-
t ions. They show that the gain in economie growth turns out to be small and not robust 
but there is a sizable welfare gains from financial liberalization. Levchenko et al. (2009) 
analyze t he effects of financial liberalization on growth and volatility at the industry 
level in a l~rge sample of countries. They find that financial liberalization have a posi-
tive and significant effect on both growth and volatility of production across industries. 
Bandiera et al. (2000) utilize empirical estimate. for eight developing countries and find 
that financial liberalization does not increase private saving. Quinn and Toyoda (2008) 
empirically assess t he effect of capital account liberalization on growth and find that 
the latter has a positive effect on growth for both developed and emerging countries. 
Rancière et al. (2008) empirically show that financial liberalization enhances economie 
growth in middle-income countries, but does not have the same effect in low-income 
economies. Ang (2011) shows that financial development has a beneficiai effect on inno-
vation, while the effect of financial liberalization is found to be negative in developing 
cotmtries. 
In this paper we study for the first time the effects of banking reforms on economie 
growth. To do this, '"e measure the impact of banking reforms on gTowth according to 
the leve! of economie development for a given country. This article is based on previous 
studies on the so-called "a.ppropriate institution " . In Economie Backwardness in His-
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torical Perspective (1 962), Gcrschcnkron shows that rclatively backward economies can 
quickly catch np with the dcveloped countrics by introducing "appropriatc institu tions" 
t hat enhance growth in the first stage of development, though these instit utions may 
cease to improve growth in subsequent development. In other words, countries that have 
adoptcd the "appropriate institutions" may have high growth rates for a period, then 
slow down because such institu tions later inhibit growth . More recently, Acemoglu et 
al. (2006) in their article entit led "Distance to frontier selection and economie growth", 
using a Schumpetcrian endogenous growth paradigm have linked the concepts of ap-
propriate institut ion and distance to the frontier. To validate their theoretical results , 
they use estimates in cross-section and panel data. over the period 1965-1995 for 42 
countries. They spli t these countries into two groups a.ccording to the number of proce-
dures requir d to start a. new business as developed by Djankov et al. (2002). The first 
group consists of countries with low barriers to entry and the second countries with high 
barriers. The results suggest that economie growth does not suffer from high barriers 
to entry for co un tries far from t he technology frontier, though growth do es suffer as t he 
country approachcs the technology fronticr . 
In the same vein, we use a.n endogenous growth mode!, namcly the Schumpete-
ria.n growth para.digm inspircd by Aghion et al. (2005) where the cngine of growth is 
considered to be innovation. Another merit of t his model is that it takes into account 
the effects of convergence and divergence between countries, as opposed to neoclassical 
growth models and first-generation endogenous growth models, uch that Ak or varie-
t ics of intermediate goods of Romer (1990). Final output technology combines labor and 
intermediate inputs and these intermediate inputs, arc produced by innovators (entre-
preneurs) who enjoy monopoly power since they employ technology tha.t is closest to the 
frontier . Endogenous growth and convergence to the frontier are driven by innovation in 
the intermediate sector, which is performed by entrepreneurs needing external finance. 
Innova tors ( entreprenems) thns face costs ( so they barrow), w hi ch are linear in terms 
of success proba.bility and proportiona.l to the technological frontier level. If successful , 
they a.lso enjoy profits which are proportional to the frontier technology. Innova.tors do 
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not take the interest rate as given, but interact strategically with banks. Renee, expec-
ted profitability from R&D depends on the amount invested in three ways : negatively 
because it is a cost, positively because it increa.<;es the probability of entrepreneurial 
innovation, and also because it reduces the interest rate on loans. 
To measure the effects of banking reforms on growth in our madel, we use mono-
polistic competition bet,,een differentiated products in the ba.nking ystem, following 
Salop (1979) and Freixas and Rochet (2008). Commercial banks are located on a circle 
and compete for depo it from household (who are also entrepreneur ) uniformly dis-
tributed around a circle and who have a preference for doser bank . Banks use the 
deposits to !end to entrepreneurs and compete in the rate of return paid on deposits 
(deposit rate) and the interest rate charged on lending to entrepreneurs (loan rate). 
vVe use symmetric equilibrium in the banking sector, according to which banks pay 
the same deposit rate and loan rate. Banks also attract t he same number of deposi-
tors and lcnd to the same number of entrepreneurs who are located closest to them. 
Banks have to pay a proportional transaction cost on lending, a proportional service 
cost on deposits, and an interbank interest rate on inter-bank borrowing. The number of 
banks are endogenously determined in equilibrium using a zero-profit condition. Mono-
polistic competition in the banking sector allow us to introduce the effects of banking 
reforms on innovation, and at the same time on growth. Moreover, when each borrower 
(entrepreneur) borrows moncy from a bank, he or she incur a transportation cost À 
proportional to the distance between the borrower's location and that of the bank. We 
use the fixed costs F as a proxy for the measure of banking reforms. The fL'<ed costs F 
can be interpreted as a barrier to entry ; specifically, it may take the form of outright 
restrictions on the participation of foreign banks, restrictions on the scope of a bank's 
activities, restrictions on the geographie ar a where banks can operate, or excessively 
restrictive licensing requirements following Abiad et al. (2010). Reducing the value ofF 
facilitates access to credit for iru1ovators and at the same time increases the innovation 
rate ; we provide more details on this la ter on in the paper. 
To b st of our knowledge, this article is the first in the literature to theoretically 
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and empirically examine the relationship between banking reforms, distance to the tech-
nology front ier and economie gTowth. By u ing the free entry in the banking sector wc 
theoretically determine the number of banks and show that it depends positively on 
the strength of banking refonns F. The strcngth of banking reforms is measured by 
the transportation costs of entrepreneurs ; as wc show above, these costs are propor-
tional to the distance between a bank and a marginal entrepreneur. The equilibrium 
number of banks through free entry allows us to determine the equilibrium probability 
of entrepreneurial innovation. Vve then show that the probability of entreprenemial in-
novation is an increasing function of the level of banking reforms for countries close to 
the world technology frontier. The assumption is that countries where the distance is 
small, or where banking reforms through free entry tend to reduce the distance, have 
a large number of banks. Banking reforms tend to favor the emergence of new banks 
in the cconomy and facilitate access to credit for ent reprenem s. This process increases 
innovation rates, which positively affects the overall productivity of t he economy. T his 
restùt is very important for our paper, as it shows that barriers to entry (low banking 
reforms) have limited costs when countrie are far from t he vvorld technology frontier , 
but become much more costly closer to the technology frontier. More precisely, it sug-
gests t hat there exists a level of technological development (distance to the technology 
frontier) such that, if an economy does not switch out of low banking reforms before 
this threshold, low banking reforms are detrimental to economie growth. 
The interpretation of om finclings is as follows. A the global technology frontier 
advances, the size of investment required in order to keep innovating is very high ; there-
fore, important banking reforms through free entry en able innovators to have more funds 
to innovate by reducing loan rates . Iviore importantly, R&D and innovation become 
more important when an economy approaches the world technology frontier. However , 
for countries far from the technological frontier, problems of selection, moral hazard 
and agency costs are very high; to reduce these problems that affect the amount allo-
cated to entrepreneurs market power in the banking sector can alleviate the negative 
effects of information asymmetries on innovation, and thereby on economie grmvth. In 
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addition, our theoretical model shows that countries close to the world technolog;y fron-
tier have a higher number of banks. Our theoretical model shows that the teady-state 
technology gap is increasing at the level of banking reforms . Finally, we capture the ef-
fects of convergence between countries through banking reforms, whereby each country 
converges in the long run in relation to its own proximîty to the technology frontier , 
and countries wi th high levels of banking reforms will converge to higher values. These 
theoretical findings are the first in the existing literatme, to the be t of our knowledge. 
The following results are shawn in our model. The increase in the number of banks 
through banking reform increase the deposit rate, which then increases the loanable 
funds of banks. In our second step, banking reforms have the e:ffect of red LLCing loan rates 
for innovators and thu increases the probabîlity of entrepreneurîal innovation, which 
positively affect the productivity of the economy. Besanko and Thakor (1992) examine 
the effects of lowering the entry barriers into banking and show that increased competi-
tion in the banking sector benefits sa.vers and borrowers becau e loan rate decline and 
deposît rates rise. Boot and Thakor (2000) increase competition in their study, whether 
from the capital market or from other banks, and demonstrated an improvement in 
borrower welfare. Recently, Dîallo and Koch (2013) theoretîcally and empirically study 
the effects of bank concentration on growth and how that bank concentration increases 
Joan rate. for innovator. · and that the effects of bank concentration on conomic growth 
depend on the 1 vel of technological development. Specifically, their results suggest that 
bank concentration is more harmful to growth for countries clo e to the world technology 
frontier. 
In order to verify our theoretical pr dictions we use cross-cmmtry and panel data 
estimates. We split our ample into low-reform and high-reform countries according 
to the median of banking reform measured by the index developed by Abiad et al. 
(2010). We give more details in the empirical section of this paper of the measurem nt 
of banking reforms. Dummy high reforms is equal to 1 for hîgh-reform countries if the 
banking reform index for a country is greater or equal to the median of the index and into 
low-reform otherwise. This allows us to share our sample in 39 countri s for high reforms 
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and 39 cow1tries for low reforms. The proximity to t he frontier is defined as the ratio 
of the country's per-worker GDP to the U.S. per-worker GDP at the beginning of the 
sample in 1980. We then regress the average per-worker GDP growth rate over the period 
1980-2010 on dummy hîgh and low reforms, and the interactions between the proximîty 
to the world frontier and high and low reforms, respectively, u ing \Vhite's consistent 
standards errors for statistical inference. However, our results remaîn robust to the use 
of the average per-capita GDP growth rate; ·we present these results in the robustness 
te ts section. We show that the effects of banking reforms on economie growth depend on 
the level of technological development of countries. Specifically, our findings suggest that 
low-reform countries converge rapidly when they are far from the technology frontier but 
slow down significantly neal' the technological frontier. These results remain robust to 
the use of several control variables, namely private credit to measure the level of financial 
development, t rade, and macroeconomie policies including inflation rate, moncy growth 
(M2), budget balance and government consumption . They also remain robust to the 
exclusion of OECD count ries. To exploit the relevant information we use panel data 
averaged over five 5-year taking into account countrie and year-fixed effects. Doing t hi , 
we regress the average per-worker GDP growth on the proximity to the world technology 
frontier , banking reforms and the interaction tenu between the proximity to the world 
technology frontîer and banking reforms using clustering standards errors for statistical 
inference. The coefficient of the interaction term now captures the difference between 
the coefficients of the interaction between low-reform countries and the proximity to 
t he world technology frontier , and the interaction between high-reform countries and 
the proximity to the world technology frontier in cross-sectional specifications. Vve find 
that low-reform countries slow clown the doser they get to the technology frontier. More 
precisely banking reforms have a positive and significant effect for countries close to the 
worlcl technology frontier. Our results remain robust to the introduction of the control 
variables listed above. 
Our paper introduces several crucial novelties to the existing li terature. To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to theoretically and empirically measure 
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the effects of banking reforms on innovation and economie growth a.ccording to the level 
of technological development. It also builds a bridge between appropriate institutions 
and growth , and banking reforms. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows . 
Section 2.2 outlines the basic structure of the theoretica.l model, section 2.3 confronts 
the theoretical predictions by using empirical investigation, and section 2.4 summarizes 
the findings. 
2.2 Theoretical Framcwork 
2.2.1 A simple Schumpcterian t heoretica.l framework 
In this paper, we use the theoretical Schumpeterian growth paradigm developed 
over the past decade by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004), Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2006), according to which time is consid red discrete, and there is a 
continuum of individuals in each country. There are J countries, inde.xed by j = 1, .. . , J , 
which do not exchange goods and factors , but are technologically intèrdependent in the 
sense that they use technological ideas developed elsewhere in the world. Each country 
has a fixed population, L , which we normalize to one L = 1, so that aggregate and per 
capita quantities coïncide. Each individual lives two· periods and is endowed with two 
units of labor services in the first period and none in the second. The utility function is 
assumed to be linear in consumption , so that U = c1 + f3c2, where c1 and c2 represent 
consumption in the first and second periods of life, respectively, and f3 E (0, 1) is the 
rate at which individuals discount the utility consumption in the second period relative 
to that in the first. 
Production of final good Consider a country j, where we drop country-index without 
loss of genera.lity, and where there is only one general good yt, taken as the numéraire, 
produced by specialized intermediate goods and labor as : 
1 
yt = L1-a la At(v)1-aXt(v)adv with 0 <a< 1 (2. 1) 
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where Xt(v) is the country input of intermediate good v such that v E [0, 1], and At(v) 
is the technological productivity parameter associated with it . The final good is used 
for consumption, a..c; an input into entrepreneurial innovation and the production of 
intermediate goods. Producers of the general good act as perfect competitors in all 
markets, so that the inverse demands for intermediate goods and labor are given by : 
(FOC) { 
Pt(v) = ŒXt(v)':~<-l At(v)l-a 
Wt = (1- a)yt 
for all sectors v E [0 , 1] (2.2) 
Production of intermediate goods For each intermediate good v, there is an innovator 
who enjoys a monopoly power in the production of this intermediate good, and produces 
a unit of the intermediate good by using 1 uni t of the final good. The finn ma.ximizes 
its profits given by : 
(2.3) 
The first order condition allows us to find the equilibrium quantity of intermediate good 
2 
v of quality At(v) given by : Xt(v) = a 1-a At(v). The equilibrium priee of intermediate 
good v is gi ven by : Pt (v) = a-I, so that the equilibri um profit of intermediate firm is 
written as : 
l+o 
7rt(v) = (1 - a)a 1-oAt(v) = 1rAt(v) (2.4) 
where 1r = (1- a)a~, so t hat the profit earned by t he incumbent in any sector v will 
be proportional to the productivity parameter in that sector. 
GDP and growth rate Substituting the equilibrium quantity Xt(v) into the final good 
production function (2 .1) shows that the equilibrium output of the general good is 
proportional to the average productivity parameter de:fined as : At = fol At(v)dv, so 
that : 
2a 
yt = Ql-aAt (2.5) 
as weil a.s wages of country j : 
2a 
Wt = (1- a)a 1-" At= wAt (2.6) 
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2e> 
where w = (1-a)a:I-a . F inally, the GDP of country j is equal to the sum of dïstributed 
revenues, profits and wages, to households : 
GDPt = Wt + 11 1rt(v)dv = (1r + w)At (2.7) 
Therefore , the aggregate per capita GDP growth rate is t he same as t he average 
A 
productivity parameter : 1 + gj, t = -A t , and wc focus on this last to determine the 
t-1 
growth properties of country j. 
Technological Change Following Aghion et aL (2005), in each intermediate good sector 
v , a continuum of persons wit h an entrepreneurial idea is born in period t capable of 
producing an innovation in period t + 1, and if successful becomes the vth incumbent 
at t + 1. vVe denote f.Lt+1(v) as the probability of ent repreneurial innovation , the level 
of technology of intcrmediate goods sector v in the period t + 1 , A t+l( v ) according to 
t he following process : 
with probability f.Lt+l (v) 
wit h probability 1- f.Lt+l(l/) 
where .At+1 denotes the world technology frontier which grows at t he constant rate 
g > O. The average productivity thus evolves according to : 
(2.8) 
In equilibrium, a we show below, the proba.bility of entrepreneurial innovation will be 
t he same in each sector : f.Lt+l(v) = f-Lt+l· Replacing and integrating this equation on 
both sides, t he average productivity becomes : 
(2.9) 
At Let us denote at = At the proximity to the world technology frontier of the average 
productivity of a country, its dynamics is given by the following law of motion : 
(2.10) 
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2.2.2 Banking Sector 
Following Monti (1972), Klein (1971) and Salop (1979) (and reviewed in Freixas-
Rochet (2008)), we model the banking sector in a context of monopolistic competition 
between differentiated products for loans and deposits. The banking sector is composed 
of nt+l banks indexed i = 1, .. , nt+l· Bank i pays transaction linear costs between loans 
and deposits C(Dt+l(i), Tt+l(i)) = "(D Dt+l(i) + "fTTt+l(i) , where "fD, "fT E [0, 1] are 
cost parameters associated with t he deposit and loan activit ies, respectively. The banks 
offer multi-product services (deposits and loans), and there are two types of population 
(depositors and borrowers). V\Te consider a continuum of depositors of mass one and 
a continuum of borrowers of mass one both uniformly distributed along a circle; the 
'nt+1 banks are located on the same circle. Moreover , when each depositor deposits 
money in a bank, he or she incurs a transportation cost e proportional to the distance 
Îl,( i) between the depositor 's location and that of bank. To determine the demand for 
deposits Dt+l (i) of ~ank ·i in this situation , it is necessary to compute the location of the 
marginal depositor who is indifferent about going to bank i or bank i + 1. The distance 
Îl,( i) between this marginal depositor and bank i is defined by : 
rD,t+l(i) - Bh(i) = TD,t+l(i + 1)- e -- h(i) ~ ( 1 ~ ) 
. nt+l 
(2.11) 
We can find Îl,(i) such that : 
Îl,(i) = TD ,t+l(i)- TD,t+l(i + 1) + _1_ 
28 2nt+l (2.12) 
The demand for deposits of bank i is given by : 
D wt(i) = 2Î1 (i) = rD,t+l (i)- ·rD,t+l(i + 1) + _1_ 
e nt+l 
(2.13) 
When each borrower (entrepreneur) borrows money from a bank, he or she incurs a 
transportation co t À proportional to the di tance h(j) between the borrower's location 
and that of the bank. To determine the supply of loans Tt+l ( i) of bank i in this situation, 
it is necessary to compute the location of the marginal borrower who is indifferent about 
going to bank i or bank i + 1. The distance Î1( i) between this marginal borrower and 
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bank i is defined by : 
·rt+l(i) + Àh(i) = rt+l(i + 1) +À -- h(i) - ( 1 - ) 
nt+l 
(2.14) 
We can find h(i) such that : 
(2.15) 
The supply of loans of bank i is as follows : 
(2.16) 
In the period t + 1, the bank chooses rt+1(i) and rD,t+ 1(i) so asto maximize its profits 
given by: 
subjcct to the following constraints : 
T, . (i) = Tt+l(i+l) -Tt+I(i) + _1_ 
t+l À nt+l 
D ( ·) _ ro t+l(i)-ro.t+I(i+l) + _1_ 
t+1 2 - () nL+ 1 
Bt+1(i) = Rt+1(i) + Tt+!(i)- Dt+1(i) 
Rt+l(i) = pDt+l(i) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
where Tt+1 ( i) and Dt+l ( i) are, respectively, the supply of loans and demand ford posits 
of bank i , Rt+l ( i) is the reserves of bank i, which equal a proportion p of dcposits. T 
is the interbank rate and p the coefficient of compulsory reserves. T and p may be used 
as a Central Bank instrument. Bt+ 1(i) is the net position of bank i on the interbank 
market, and equals the sum of the reserves and loans minus deposits. Substituting the 
constraints, the problem becomes : 
subject to : 
{ 
T, (i) = Tt+l(i+l)-rt+I(i) + _1_ 
t+1 À nt.+l 
D (i) = ·ro .t+I(i)-ro.t+I(i+l) + _1_ 
t+1 () nt+l 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
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The banks have sam e cost function taken linear , and the same supply of loans and 
demand for deposits; thus a unique equilibrium is given by : rv,t+I (i -1) = TD,t+ l (i ) = 
r'D,t+l (i + 1) = ... = r'D ,t+l and Tt+l (i - 1) = Tt+l('i) = Tt+l (i + 1) = ... = Tt+ l · 
The deposit rate is independent of the probability of entrepreneurial innovation, 
and its expression is as follows : 
T'ÎJ t+ l = T(1 - p)- "fD- _()_ 
' nt+l 
(2.21) 
Proposition 7 shows the relation hip between deposit rate TD,t+l and the number 
of banks nc+l · 
Proposition 7. The deposit mte T'D ,t+l depends positively on the number of banks nt+l· 
Proof These propert ies follow directly from differentiating equation (2.21 ) . • 
The loan rate depends on the number of banks, the probability of entrepreneurial 
innovation, borrowers' transportation costs, the interbank rate and bank management 
costs. Its expression is given by : 
(2.22) 
The following proposition est ablishes the link between loan rat e T't+I and the 
number of banks nt+l· It implies t hat an increase in number of banks n t+l reduces, the 
loan rat e for entrepreneurs. 
Proposition 8. The loa.n rate rt+1 depends negatively on the nnm ber of banks nt+l · 
Proof These properties follow directly from differentiating equation (2.22) . • 
Proposition 7 and Proposit ion 8 are quite intuit ive. First, an increase in the 
number of banks by banking reforms i.e. free entry in the banking sector increases the 
deposit rate, which allow banks to have more funds. Second, an increase in the number 
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of bank al o has the effect of reducing the loan rate. This would subsequently allow 
entrepreneurs in the innovation sector to borrow at a lower costs and thus increase 
the probability of entrepreneurial innovation, wh.ich in turn would have a positive and 
significant effect on productivity. 
2.2.3 Innovation Sector 
At the beginning of second period, a household has the opportunity to b ,come 
an entrepreneur (innovator), and the cast of innovation is given by : 
Zt+l (v) 1 ( ) 
A = 'lf.! fkt+l v t+l 
(2.23) 
where Zt+ l (v) is the total investment in terms of the final good, and 'lj; > 0 is a parameter 
which affects the cost of innovation. The total investment is adjusted to the world 
technology frontier At+l to ta.ke into account the fact that it becomes more expensive 
to main tain an innovation rate of flt+l (v) as the technology frontier ad van ces. 
Households earn a wage at the end of the first period, Wt, given by (2.6), which 
they save at the bank with a return rate r D,t+l· They barrow the amou nt Zt+l (1/)- (1 + 
rD,t+dwt = Tt+l(v) from the bank because the wage received is not sufficient to 1nit1ate 
an innovation. Therefore, in equilibrium, flt+l (v) will be chosen by the innovators so as 
to maximize the expected net profits : 
subject to : 
1 
Zt;+l(v) = .1, , (v) 
At+! 'f' t-"t+l 
r . __ À_ + T+')'T 
t+l - nt+! f.tt+l 
TD t+l = T(l- p)- 'YD- - 0-
, nt+ l 
(2.25) 
The FOC allows us to find the expression of the probability of entrepr neurial innovation 
flt+l according to the number of banks '14+1 and the proximity to the world technology 
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front ier at. 1 
f.ht+ l = 
(T + /T)(n,- _nB )wat 
t+l (2 .26) 
where n, = T(1- p) + (1-rD) and w = 1~9 . Equation (2.26) allows us to study the effect 
of the proximity to the world technology frontier at on the probability of entrepreneurial 
innovation l.tt+l· The following proposition states that if profits are to be positive, that 
is, if innovation is viable, then the probability of entrepreneurial innovation increases 
with the number of banks in the economy. 
Proposition 9. If 7f > ;:~ , then the probability of entrepreneurial innovation f.ht+l zs 
an increasing fnnction of the m.tmber of banks nt+l , â~f.ht+l > O. 
nt+1 
Proof These properties follow directly from differentiating equation (2.26). • 
2.2.4 Equilibrium and the number of banks with free entry 
Since there are no entry restrictions, the eqtùlibrium number of banks will be 
obtained when the profit is equal to fixed costs F , which gives : 
B 1 1 
rrt+l = (f.ht+lrt+l- T- /T )--- (T(p- 1) +ID+ rD ,t+l)-- = F 
nt+l nt+l 
(2.27) 
Substituting the expressions of loan rate, and deposit rate given by equations (2.21) 
and (2.22) , respectively, and the expression of the probability of the entrepreneurial 
innovation given by equation (2.26), allows us to find the following equation : 2 
F2 (1r- 'lj;)nfH- F 2 À'l/Jni+1 - 2Fe(1r- '1/;)nr+1 + 2FB)..'lj;n;+ 1 + 
[B2 (1r- 'lj; )- )..2 (T + rr)wn,at] nt+l + )..2 (T + rr)Bwat- )..'lj;B2 = 0 
~ (1-cx)cx~ 
where 1r = (1-a)a 1 -"', n, = T(1- p)+(1-rD) and w = l+g .. The parameter Fin 
our model measures the strength of banking reforms. The fixed costs ).. can b interpreted 
1. See Appendix A. 
2. See Appendix A. 
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as a barrier to entry ; specifically, it may take the form of outright restrictions on the 
participation of foreign banks, restrictions on the scope of a ba.nk's activities , restrictions 
on the geographie area where banks can operate, or . excessively restrict ive licensing 
requirements. Reducing the value of F facilitates access to credit for innovator. and 
at the same time increases the innovation rate. The following proposition numerically 
shows that the equilibrium number of banks n;+l increases with the level of banking 
reforms À and F , which can be interpreted as barriers to entry. Specifica.lly it may take 
the form of outright re trictions on the participation of foreign banks; restrictions on the 
scope of bank 's activities; restrictions on the geographie area where banks can operate; 
or excessively restrictive licensing requirements. 
Proposition 10. The equilibrium number of banks n;+l is an increasing function of 
' an;+l 
the level of bankmg reforrns F; ----aF < 0 
Proof See Appendix A. • 
Free entry into the banking sector increases the number of banks in the economy · 
in our model the main component that promotes the entry of banks is the strength of 
banking reforms. In order to measure the level of banking reforms we use the fixed costs, 
noted by F. A high value ofF corresponds to weak banking reforms, and a low value 
corresponds to strong banking reforms. When the level of banking reforms is weak t here 
are fewer banks and therefore more it is di:fficult for entrepreneurs to borrow funds for 
innovation. However, when the level of banking reforms is strong there are more banks, 
and consequently it is easier for entrepreneurs to barrow funds . The next proposition is 
the most important result of our paper. It shows that t he probability of entrepreneurial 
innovation increases with the level of banking reforms. 
Proposition 11. The equilibrium probability of entrepreneurial innovation p,;+ l is an 
a * 
increasing function of the le11el of banking reforms F; ~~1 < 0 . 
Proof See Appendix A. • 
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Proposition 11 cornes from Propositions 9 and 10. It intui tion is as follows. If 
the distance between entrepreneurs' location and the bank is low t hrough high banking 
reforms i.e . free entry then countries have a higher probability of success in innovation . 
From Propositions 9 and 10 the probability of entrepreneurial innovation increases with 
the number of banks , which also increa.'3es with the level of banking reforms. Strong 
banking reforms encourage the introduction of new banks through free entry, which 
facilitates access to credit for innovator . This allows entrepreneurs to borrow with 
lower loan rates and at the same time increases the amount allocated to innovators, 
which promotes innovation by increasing the rate of success. This augmentation of the 
probability of innovation increases the productivity. The channel t hrough which banking 
reforms affect the probability of entrepreneurial innovation is the free entry into the 
banking sector. As we showed above, stronger banking reforms increase the number of 
banks and this process facilitates access to credit for innovators, which in turn positively 
affects the probability of ent repreneurial innovation. Innovation and R&D ru:e important 
factors for economie growth in our model. Thus, deep banking reforms allow countries 
to facilitate a.ccess to credit for entrepreneurs and thus increase t he innovation t hat 
positively aff cts economie growt h. 
2.2.5 Dynamics and banking reforms 
The dynamics of the proximity to the world technological frontier evolve according 
to : 
(2.28) 
where the equilibrium probability of entrepreneurial innovation is given by equation 
(2.26). The following proposit ion establishes the relationship between the dynamics of 
the proximity to the world technology frontier and convergence through banking reforms 
through free entry. This implies that countries converge in the long run to the steady 
state a*. 
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2.3 Methodology and Empirical Evidence 
2.3.1 Data 
Our dependent variable is the average per-worker GDP gTowth rate over the 
period 1980-2010 taken from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Aten et al., 2012). However, 
our results remain also robust to the use of the average per capita GDP growth rate. 
We present these results in the robustness tests section. 
Banking Reforms The data on banking reforms are taken from Abiad et al. (2010) , who 
use seven aggTegate variables: credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements 
(0-4), aggregate credit ceilings (0-1), interest rate controls (0-4), entry barriers (0-5) , 
capital account restrictions (0-3), privatization (0-3) , securities market policy (0-5) and 
prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector (0-6). In general, 0 indicates 
fully repressed and the higher value fully liberalized. ote that for banking regulation 
and supervision a high score indicates high regulation, which implies that the country 
has reformed its banking sector while a low score indicates an unregulated banking 
sec tor. 
Other control variables, from the vVorld Bank WDI, 3 are used in our estimations: 
school, private credit, macroeconomie policies (money growth, inflation rate, budget ba-
lance, government consumption and trade). School, measured by the total emollment 
in secondary education regardless of age, is expressed as a percentage of the popula-
tion of official secondary education age. Private credit provided by the banking sector 
includes all credit to varions sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to 
the central government, which is net. Private credit is our proxy for financial develop-
ment, following Aghion et al. (2005) and Beek et aL (2000) , who argue that private 
credit is a good measure of financial development. Macroeconomie policies include : 
money growth is an average annual growth rate in money ; inflation, consumer priee 
3. The vVorld Development Indicators are publicly available at http: 1 /vrww. worldbank. org/. 
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index, as measured by the consumer priee index, refiects the annual percenta.ge change 
in t he cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that 
may be fixed or changed a.t specified intervals, su ch as yearly, (the Laspeyres formula 
is generally used) ; budget Balance as % of GDP is cash surplus or deficit revenue (in-
cluding grants) minus expenses, and net acquisition of non-financial assets . In the 1986 
GFS manual , non-financial assets were included under revenue and expenditure in gross 
terms ; govemment consumption (% of GDP) includes all current government expen-
ditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees) and 
tmde calculated as the sum of exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP). The data 
on population growth are taken from the Penn World Table 7.1. Table 2.1 presents the 
summary statistics of variables. 
Table 2 .1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs l\!lean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Growth 411 0.014 0.031 -0.109 0.112 
R forms 411 11.796 5.933 0 21 
log(Front) 411 -1.789 1.238 -4.823 0.119 
Money growth (M2) 377 53.415 288.418 -4.782 4733.971 
Inflation 404 52.449 306.840 -5.111 482 .7 
School 371 25.439 20.749 0.094 92.458 
Govern. con ump. 390 15.295 5.610 4.135 38.274 
Trade 405 68.625 49.329 13.950 390.535 
Private credit 399 65.320 46.962 5.061 306.973 
Table 2.2 shows the correlations among the variables. We find that the average 
per-worker GDP growth rate is positively and significa.ntly correlated with banking re-
fonns , school and trade at the 1% level. This suggests that banking reforms , school 
and trade exert a positive and significant effect on growth. The correlation between 
the average per-worker GDP gro-wth rate and money growth , inflation and government 
consumption is negative and . ·ignificant. However, the measure of banking reforms is po-
sit ively and significantly correlated with t he proximity to the world technology frontier 
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at the 1% level, which suggests that banking reforms increase wi th the proximity to the 
world technology frontier. Banking reforms is also positively and significantly correlated 
with school, government consumption and trade at the 1% level. F inally, the proximi ty 
to the world technology front ier is posit ively and significantly correlated with school, 
government consumption and t rade at the 1% level, but negatively ignificant at 10%. 
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2.3.2 Cross-country Evidence 
The econometrie specification is as follows : 
J( 
Growthi = 81 ,H RH~+82,LRL~ +83Fronti x H~ +84F\·onti x L~+~ 8kxk,i +Çi (2.29) 
k=l 
where i denotes country and Xi = [xl,i, ... , XK,i] is a set of K control variables defined 
below, and Çi is the error term. Wc test the link between growth, distance to fr·ontier; 
and banking reforms using cross-country data from 78 countries over the period 1980-
2010. Growthi is the average per-\vorker GDP grovvth rate over the period 1980-2010 
using per-worker GDP data from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Aten et al., 2012). 4 The 
proximity to the technology frontier is denoted by Fronti in our econometrie specification 
and is defined as yYi'1980 , where Yi 1980 is per-worker GDP in country i in 1980 and 
U SA ,l980 ' 
Y usA,l980 is per-worker GDP in the United States in 1980. We split our sample into 
low-reform (LR) and high-reform (HR) countries according to the median of banking 
reforms. We then define two dummy variables noted by HR and LR for high reforms 
and low reforms , respectively. HR is equal to 1 for high-reform countries, and LR takes 
the value 1 for the low-reform countries. Countries are classified into the high-reform if 
the measure of banking reforms is g;reater or equal to the median of banking reforms, 
and into the low-reform group otherwise. This implies that 39 countries are classified 
as high reforms and 39 as low reforms. For control our reslùts for sub-Sahru·an African 
countries (SA) using a dummy variable that equal to 1 if country is a SA et 0 if not. 
Table 2.3 shows the results of specifications. To treat heteroskedasticity problems, 
we u e vVhite 's consistent standard errors for statistical inference. The specifications ru·e 
estimated using ordinary least squru·es (OLS) . The dependent variable is the average 
per-worker GDP growth rate over the period 1980-2010. In column (1) we regress the 
growth rate on high and lo:w reform countries, the interaction term between high-reform 
4. We use RGDPWOK as a measure of real GDP and PWT 7.1 is publicly available at 
https://pwt.sas. upenn .edu/ 
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and the proximity to the world technology frontier, the interaction tenn betwèen low-
reform and the proximity to the world technology frontier and the dummy Sub-Sah aran 
African value . T he coefficient associated \vith high reform enters positively and signi-
ficantly different from zero at the 1% level. T his suggests that high banking reforms 
have a positive and significant effect on the average per-worker GDP growth rate. T he 
interaction between high-reform and the proximity to the technology frontier enters 
nega.tively but insignifica.nt ly, while the interaction bet'' 'een low-reform and the proxi-
mity to t he world technology frontier enters nega.tively and statistically significant a.t 
the 1% level. This result implies tha.t low-reform count ries converge ra.pidly when they 
are far from t he tech nol ogy front ier but low clown significant ly close the fl·ontier. This 
suggests that low banking reforms are detrimental to economie growth for count ries 
close to the world technology frontier. T he difference between t he coefficients of the two 
interactions terms is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column (2) we control 
for school, and the coefficient of the interaction between low-reform and t he proximity 
t o the world technology frontier is negative and sig11ificant at the 1% level. There is 
a strong negative correlation between the average per-worker GDP growth rate and 
t he proximity to the world technology frontier for countries wit h low banking reforms. 
This suggests that closer to the world technology frontier , countries with low banking 
reforms have a negative and significan t effect on the average per-worker GDP growth 
rate even though we cannat reject the bypothesis tbat these two coefficients are equal 
(p-value = 0.305). School is positively and significantly related to growth at the 1% 
level, a finding consist ent with the results of Barro and Sala-I-Mart in (1 997), Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2007) and Vandenbussche et al. (2006) . In column (3) we control for 
the dummy Sub-Saharan Africa and school. Our results remain robust and show that 
count ries with low banking reforms slow down more significant ly when they approach 
t he technology frontier. The difference between the coefficients of the interactions enters 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Private credit is introduced in column ( 4) to 
take into account the level of financial development of countries. High-reform interacted 
with the p roximity to the world technology frontier remains negative but i:nsignificant 
while t he interaction between low-reform and the proximity to the front ier is negative 
76 
and significant at the 1% level. The difference between these two coefficients is also 
statistically significant at the 10% level. We control for the degree of openness measu-
red by trade of a country in column (5). The interaction between low-reform and the 
proximity to the world technology frontier remains negative and significant at the 1% 
level, which suggests that low-reform countries do relatively well when they are far from 
the technology frontier but slow down significantly doser to the technology frontier. We 
also find that the difference between the coefficients of interactions terms is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient associated with tracte enters posit ively and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This suggests th at tracte enhances the 
average per-worker GDP growth rate. Columns (6) and (7) add macroeconomie variables 
(inflation rate, moncy growth (M2), budget balance and government consumption), and 
legal origin (British, French and German), respectively. Low-reform interacted with the 
proximity to the world technology frontier remains negative and significant at the 1% 
level. We show that the effects of banking reforms on growth depends on the level of 
economie development of country. T his confirms our theoretieal implications and empi-
rical estimates. In addition, the coefficient associated with the french legal origin enters 
negatively and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that french legal 
origin countries have lmver levels of economie growth, a finding consistent with the 
literature. 
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2.3.3 Panel Evidence 
We now estimate the panel specifications using the following equation : 
K 
Growthi,t = a+o1Fronti,t+o2Reformsi,t+o3Fl:onti,t x Reformsi,t+ L okxk,i,t +Çi+(t +t:i,t 
k=l 
(2.30) 
where i and t denote country and period; a, Çi, and (t denote the intercept , country, 
and t ime fixed effects, respectively and Xi ,t = [xl ,i,t, ... , XK,i ,t] is a set of K control 
variables defined below. We therefore test the link between growth and banking reforms 
using panel data for 90 countries over the period 1980-2010 where data are averaged 
over five 5-year periods between 1980 and 2010. 5 The proximity of country i to the 
world technology frontier, defined as the maximum of initial per-worker real GDP' at 
the beginning of each sub-period, and subsumed as at in the t heoretical model and 
denoted Fronti,t in our econometrie specification, is measured as the logarit_hm of the 
ratio of the initial per-worker real GDP of country i over the 5-year period to the initial 
per-worker real GDP of the United States. Reformsi.t is a measure of banking reforms 
of the country i in period t. To treat heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems in 
our specifications, we use clustering standard errors for statistical inference. Note that 63 
now captures the difference between 61,H R and o2,LR in our cross-country specification. 
The results are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. We first regress the average per capita 
GDP gTowth rate on the proximity to the technology frontier, banking reforms and the 
interaction between t hese two variables using OLS standard, country dummie~, country 
and year dummies and the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimation, respectively. As we can see, 
the proximity to the world t echnology is negatively and statistically related to growth at 
the 1% level, which suggests that there is convergence among countries and that banking 
reforms enhances the average per capita GDP growth rate using OLS standard, column 
5. The first period covers tbe years 1980-1985; the second period covers the years 19 6-1990; the 
third period covers the years 1991-1995 and so on. The last period covers the years 2006-2010. 
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(1). Columns (2) and (3) introduce country dummies and country and year dummie . 
The proximity to the world technology frontier remains negative and significant at the 
1% level, while the coefficient as ·ociated with banking reforms enters positively and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. To treat a possible endogeneity, we 
then introduce the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimation in colwnn (4). The coefficients 
associated with the proximity to the frontier and banking reforms remain negative and 
significa.nt and positive and significant, respectively at the 1% level. Our main results 
are presented in columns (5)-(8). School as a control and the interaction between the 
proximity to the world teclmology frontier and banking reforms, and country dummies 
are introduced in column (5). The proximity to the world technology frontier enters 
negatively and . tatistically significant at the 1% level. Banking reforms remain positive 
but insignificant, while the interaction tenn enters negatively and significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. This result is very important in the en e that it confirms our 
predictions and stimations using cross-sectional estimates. Banking reforms positively 
and significantly affect economie growth for countries close to the world technology 
front ier. School increases the average per capita. GDP growth. These findings confirm 
the results obtained above and at the same time validate our theoretical predictions. 
Column (6) adds country dummies and year dummies after controlling for school. The 
proximity to the world technology frontier rem ain negative and . ignificant at the 1% 
level, while banking reforms remain positive but insiginificant. However, the interaction 
term enters negatively and significantly at the 5% level. In column (7), we control for 
trade using country dummies. The interaction terrn between the proximity to the world 
technology frontier and banking reforms remain negative and significant at the 10% level. 
This suggests that the measure of banking reform has a positive and significant effect 
on growth for countrics close to the world tcchnology fronticr. Column (8) adds country 
dummies and year dummies . The proximity to the world technology fi·ontier and the 
interaction remain negative and significant at the 1% and 10% levels , re pectively. This 
suggests that, controlling for trade, banking reforms have an effect on economie growth 
for co un tries close to the world technology frontier. Trade is positive! y and significantly 
related to the average per-worker GDP growth rate at the 1% level. 
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The results of the control variables, nam ely mo ney growth (M2), inflation rate, 
government consumption and population growth, are shown in Table 2.5. Note t hat in 
ali specifications the coefficient associated with t he proximity to the world technology 
frontier is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests a convergence effect 
among countries. In column (1) we use country dummies, and banking reforms is po iti-
vely related to growth even though insignificant. The interaction tenu enters negatively 
and significantly different from zero at the lü% level. Column (2) adds country and 
year dummies, and t he interaction term remains negative and significant at the lü% 
level. This suggests that banking reforms increase the average per capita GDP growth 
rate for countries close to the world technology frontier. Money growth (M2) is negati-
vely and statistically related to growth at the 1% level. Vve introd uce cotmtry and year 
dummies in column (2). The interaction tenu remains negative and significant at the 
lü% level. Inflation rate as a control is used in columns (3) and (4). Banking reform 
remain positive but insignificant, while the interaction term between the proximity to 
the world technology frontier and banking reforms has a negative and significant ef-
fect on the average per-worker GDP growth rate at the 5% level. This suggests that 
for countries close to the world technology frontier, banking reforms is positively and 
significantly related to economie growth. However, inflation exerts a negative and si-
gnificant effect on growth at the 1% level, a fin ding consistent with the large body of 
literature that studies the relationship between growth and inflation. Using country and 
year dummies in column ( 4) the interaction term remains negative and significant at 
the lü% level. In columns (7) and (8) we control for population growth. The interaction 
term enters negatively and statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level 
using country and year dummies. This suggests that banking reforms positively and 
significantly affect the average per-worker GDP growth rate for countries close to the 
world technology frontier. In columns (9) and (lü) we control for the sum of population 
growth and investment rate as in Solow (1956) using countries and period fixed effects, 
respectively. The interaction term between banking reforms and the proximity to the 
world technology frontier remains negative and significa.nt a.t the 5% and lü% level , 
respectively. This confirms the fa.ct that banking reforms is positively and significantly 
82 
related to economie growth for countries clo e to the world technology frontier. The 
coefficient associated with the Solow model enter. positively and statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level. 
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From the above, we can propose sorne solutions to improve productivity and eco-
nomie growth üi. developing countrics. Our model thcoretically and empirically suggests 
t hat banking reforrns have a positive and significant direct on the average per-worker 
GDP growth rate for countries close to the world technology frontier . Vve calculated a 
threshold for technological development in order to explain the positive effects of ban-
king reforms on growth. With our standard panel estimations, the value of technological 
development will be greater or equal to 0.56 . Countries where technological development 
reached or exceeded 0. 56 should automatically witch policies by liberalizing their ban-
king sec tors in or der to converge towards the world technology frontier . An increase also 
of t he quali ty of banking reform increases with the number of banks with frce entry, 
which in turn encourages innovation and enhances growth. Combining the first effect 
with enhancements of human capital by im esting in education, promoting trade and 
reducing public deficits can help these countries obtain growth and prosperity 
2.3.4 Robustness checks 
In ord r to test t he robustness of the results shown above, we conduct sorne ro-
bustness tests . We present the results of cross-country specification in Table 2.6. Vve 
first exclude OECD countries in our regressions, which reduces our ample to 57 coun-
tries. In column (1) , controlling for dummy sub-Saharan African countries, we regress 
the average per-worker GDP growth rate on t he interactions between low-reform coun-
tries and the proximity to the world technology frontier , and the high-reform countries 
and the proximity to the world technology frontier, high reform and low reform coun-
tries , respectively. Low reform interacted with the proximity to the frontier remains 
negative and significant at the 1% leve!, while the interaction between high reform and 
the proxii~üty to the frontier is negative but insignificant. This resul t implies t hat close 
to the '''orld technology fronticr , a givcn country with a low banking reforms grows less 
than its usual growth rate. The difference between the coefficients of the two interactions 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. Column (2) controls for school and shows that 
there is a strong negative relationship between low reform interacted with the proxi-
85 
mity to the world technology frontier and the average per-worker GDP growth rate. We 
a.dd private credit and trade in columns (4) and (5). The interaction term between low 
reform and the proximity to the world technology frontier rema.ins highly negative and 
signi.ficant a.t the 1% level. This suggests that low reform countries do relatively well 
when they are far from the world technology frontier but slow clown ignificantly doser 
to the world technology frontier. There is also a negative relationship between low re-
form and the growth rate. In columns (6) and (7) we control for macroeconomie policies 
and legal origin, respectively. Low refonn interacted with the proximity to the world 
technology frontier again enters negatively and signi.ficantly different from zero at the 
1% level. The difference between the coefficients of the two interaction is statistically 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Our results remain robust through 
the exclusion of OECD countries, and we can conclude that low-reform countries slow 
clown more wh en they are close to the world technology frontier. 
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The reslùts of panel specifications excluding OECD countries are presented in 
Table 2.7. Columns (1)-(4) regress the average per-worker GDP growth rate on the 
proximity to the world technology frontier and banking reforms using OLS standard, 
fixed effects and fixed and period efl'ects, and the Arrellano-Bond GMM estimation , 
respectively. As we can see, the coefficient associa.ted with the proximity to the vvorld 
technology frontier is negatively and significa.ntly related to growth at the 1% level, 
'Nhile banking reforms enter positively and statistically significant a.t the 1% level. These 
findings suggest that banking reforms enhance the growth rate . In order to take into 
account the effects of banking reforms on growth depending on the level of development 
of a country, we run specifications introducing the interaction term between the proxi-
mity to the world technology frontier and banking reforms. We then show the results in 
columns (5)-(8). The introduction of the interaction tenn and school (a control) and the 
use of the countries, effects allows us to show that the proximity to world technology 
frontier romains negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient associated with 
banking reforms romains positive but insignificant. However, the interaction tenn enters 
negatively and significantly at the 10% level. Thi suggests that banking reforms have 
a positive and significant effect on growth for countries close to the world technology 
frontier. In column (6) we use country and year dummies after controlling for school. 
The interaction term between banking reforms and the proximity to the world techno-
logy frontier romains negative and significant at the 10% leve!. There is also a . trong 
positive relationship between school and the average per-worker GDP growth rate at 
the 1% level. This suggests that school increases the growth rate. We control for mo ney 
growth (M2) and population growth in columns (7) and (8). The proximity to the world 
technology frontier remains negative and significant at the 1% level. The interaction 
tenn is negatively and signifi cantly related to growth. Thi suggests that closer to the 
frontier countries with low reform slow down more and banking reforms increase the 
average per-worker GDP growth rate for countries close to the world technology frontier. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
-
-
-
-
T
ab
le
 
2.
 7 
B
an
ki
ng
 R
ef
or
m
s,
 
D
is
ta
n
c
e
 t
o
 F
ro
nt
ie
r 
a
n
d 
G
ro
w
th
 u
si
ng
 p
a
n
e
l 
da
ta
 a
n
d 
e
x
c
lu
di
ng
 O
E
C
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5)
 
(6)
 
(7)
 
(8)
 
Fr
on
t 
-
0.
00
7*
* 
-
0.
05
1 *
**
 
-
0.
05
3*
**
 
-
0.
09
0*
**
 
-
0.
06
5*
**
 
-
0.
06
5*
**
 
-
0.
06
1 *
**
 
-
0.
06
5*
**
 
(0
.01
6)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0.
00
0) 
(0
.
00
0) 
(0
.00
0)
 
R
ef
o r
m
s 
0.2
25
**
* 
0.
25
9*
**
 
0.
27
3*
* 
0.
25
1 *
**
 
0.
00
6 
0.
09
5 
-
0.
00
9 
0.
00
0 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.01
0)
 
(0
.00
0)
 
(0
.95
0)
 
(0.
50
9) 
(0
.92
0)
 
(1
.00
0)
 
Fr
on
t 
x
 
R
ef
on
n
s
 
-
0.
07
6*
 
-
0.
06
8*
 
-
0.
06
6*
 
-
0.
07
6*
 
(0
.05
7)
 
(0.
09
5) 
(0.
06
9) 
(0
.06
4)
 
Sc
ho
ol
 
0.
00
1 *
**
 
0.
09
1 *
* 
(0
.00
4)
 
(0.
03~
) 
M
on
cy
 g
ro
w
th
 (M
2)
 
-
0.
00
1 *
**
 
(0
.00
0)
 
Po
p.
 g
ro
w
th
 
-
0.
12
8 
(0
.81
8)
 
N
um
be
r 
o
f o
bs
 
30
6 
30
6 
30
6 
16
8 
27
0 
27
0 
26
4 
27
0 
N
um
be
r 
o
f g
ro
u
ps
 
69
 
69
 
69
 
61
 
67
 
67
 
66
 
67
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 d
un
un
ie
s 
N
o 
Y
 es
 
Y
 es
 
0 
Y
 es
 
Y
 es
 
Y
 es
 
Y
e
·
 
Y
ea
r 
du
m
m
ie
s 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
 es
 
0 
N
o 
Y
 es
 
l 
0 
0 
o
te
s 
: 
p-
va
lu
c 
ar
e 
in 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s,
 a
il 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
a 
co
n
st
an
t. 
T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e i
s t
he
 av
er
ag
e 
pe
r-
w
o
rk
er
 G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 
ra
te
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
80
-2
01
0,
 
w
he
n 
av
ai
la
bl
e. 
Th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
in
 c
o
lu
rn
ns
 (1
) a
n
d 
(4)
 re
gr
e 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
pe
r-w
o
rk
er
 G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 
ra
te
 o
n
 t
he
 p
ro
xi
m
ity
 t
o 
th
e 
w
o
rld
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fro
nt
ie
r 
an
d 
ba
nk
in
g 
re
fo
rm
s 
m
ea
s
u
re
 u
sin
g 
O
LS
,
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s, 
co
u
n
tr
ie
 
an
d 
pe
rio
ds
 fi
xe
d 
eff
ec
ts
 a
n
d 
th
e 
A
rr
el
la
no
-B
on
d 
G
M
M
 e
st
im
at
or
 (A
rre
Ua
no
 an
d 
B
on
d,
 
19
91
), 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 C
ol
um
ns
 (5
) a
n
d 
(6)
 
00
 
00
 
co
n
tr
ol
 fo
r 
sc
ho
ol
 a
n
d 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s 
an
d 
pe
rio
ds
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s,
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 
Co
lu
rn
ns
 (7
) a
dd
s 
m
o
n
ey
 g
;ro
wt
h 
(M
2) 
u
sin
g 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
fLx
ed
 e
fre
ct
s.
 P
op
ul
at
io
n 
gr
ow
th
 a
s 
a 
co
n
tr
ol
 is
 in
tro
du
ce
d 
in
 c
o
hu
nn
 (8
) 
u
sin
g 
co
u
n
tr
y 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s. 
89 
We test the robustness of our findings using per-capita GDP growth rateinstead of 
per-worker GDP. Table 2.8 shows the results. In all specifications the interaction between 
the proximity to the world technology frontier and low reform enters negatively and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% leve!. This suggests that low-reform countries 
converge rapidly when they are far from the world technolog;y frontier but slow down 
significantly close to the technology frontier. This also implies that low banking reforms 
are more harmful for countries close to the world technology frontier. By controlling for 
sub-Saharan Africa, private credit, trade and legal origin, we find that the difference 
between the coefficients of the two interactions is statistically significant at the 5% leve!. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This paper aims to model and empirically test the effects of banking refonns 
using a Schumpeterian growth model according to the technological development of a 
country. To do this, we first expand the theoretical framework of the Schumpeterian 
growth paradigm with a Salop model of monopolistic competition in the banking sector 
and subsequently test the predictions of our model using cross-country, panel data. 
We empirically use the index of Abiad et al. (2010) to measure banking reforms, and 
theoretically show that banking reforms exer ts a positive effect on growth for countries 
close to the world technology frontier. Empirica.lly, wc regress the average per-worker 
GDP growth rate on banking reforms , the interaction between the proximity to world 
technology frontier and banking reforms using cross-country estimat s, country and 
fixed effects. Our results show that ba.nking reforms enhance the average per-worker 
GDP growth rate. Our results remain robust by introducing school , private credit as a 
measure of financia~ development, and macroeconomie policies (money growth, budget 
balance and trade) as controls. Our theoretical and empirical findings also confirm the 
importance of banking reforms in tenns of enhancing innovation and productivity. We 
also give some recommendations to policymakers to improve innovation, productivity 
and economie growth. 
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Appendix A : Proof of Proposit ions 
\ lVe first calculate t he expression of the probability to innovate J.Lt+I according to 
the proximity to the worldwide technological frontier at and the number of banks nt+l 
using FOC. We then rewrite the expression of expected net profits in the innovation 
sector using equations (2.24) and (2.25), such that : 
Developping equation (2.31), we get : 
Using FOC, we find the expression of the probability of entrepreneurial innovation Jkt+l 
according to t he proximity to worldwide teclmological front ier at and number of banks 
Jl.t+l = (2.32) 
where "' = T(l - p) + (1-ID) and w = 1~9 . 
In order to prove Proposition 9 to Proposit ion 12, we determinate the equili-
bri1.m1 number of banks according to the proximity to the world technology front ier 
at, depositors' and borrowers' transportation costs, bank management costs, the cost 
of innovation, the interbank rate and t he parameter of reserves. First we rewrite the 
expression of ban king net profits with free entry, using equation (2. 27), su ch that : 
B 1 . 1 
IIt+l = (Jl.t+ITt+I- T- Ir) --- (T (p -1) +ID+ r D,t+I)-- = F 
nt+l nt+l 
(2.33) 
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Wc substitute the expressions of loan rat e and deposit rate given by (2.21) and (2.22) 
and using equation (2 .26) find the expression of equilibrium number of banks n;+l as 
follows : 
(T+ rr)(~~;-6)wat Fnl+1 -e 
7f- >.."!/; - '1/J À 
nt+ l 
(2.34) 
Thus the equilibrium number of banks n;+l is given by the solution of the following 
equation : 
F 2(1r- 't/J )nr+l- F2 À't/Jnt+1 - 2Fe(1r- 't/J )nr+1 + 2F(}À't/Jnt+l + 
[e2 (7r- '1/J ) - À2( T + / T )w~~;at] nHl + À 2(T + 'YT )ewa.t - À't/J (} 2 = o 
l.±f!. ( 1-a)a~ 
where 1r = (1 - a)al-n , ~~; = T(1- p) + (1 - 'YD) and w = l+g . 
Proof of Proposition 10. In order to prove Proposition wc numerically solve t he follo-
wing equation : 
F 2(1r- '1/J )nr+l- F 2 À't/Jni+1 - 2Fe(1r- 't/J )nr+l + 2FeÀ't/Jnt+1 + 
[e 2 (1r - '1/J ) - À2( T + / T )w~~;at] nt+l + À2 (T + 'YT )ewat - À't/J (}2 = o 
Table 2 .9 Numerical solutions 
Fixed costs 111 112 113 
F = 0.01 0.04 2.98 3.32 
F = 0.05 0.04 1.33 1.48 
F = 0. 1 0.04 0.94 1.05 
CHAPTER III 
FINA CIAL DEPENDE CE AND GRO\tVTH DURING CRISES : WHEI 
DOES BANK EFFICIENCY REALLY MATTER? 
Abstract 
\"'e use the recent financial cri i as a shock to the supply of credit, and we ana-
lyze the effect of bank efficiency on value added growth of firms in industries that are 
most dependent on external finance. Our main results show that bank efficiency relaxed 
credit constra.ints and increased the growth rate for financially dependent industries du-
ring the crisis. This finding remains robust the introduction of control variables, namely 
financial development, bank concentration and competition, bank size and capitaliza-
tion, bank upervision , net interest ma.rgin, overhead costs, banking crises, monetary 
policy, government intervention measures and macroeconomie variables interacted with 
external financial dependence. It also remains robust to the use of everal measures of 
external financial dependence and econometrie methods. 
KEYWORDS :Bank efficiency, financial dependence, growth, financial frictions , 
banking crise. ·. 
JEL : G21, 016, F21 , F23. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The subprime crisis of 2009 reminds us how the banking sector plays an important 
role in t he real eco no my. In this paper, we consider t he crisis as a shock tha.t a.ffected the 
supply of credit of banks, and we pa.rt icularly investigate how bank efficiency alleviates 
t he effects of financial frictions on economie gwwt h . .iVIore specifically, we analyze the 
sub t a.ntial decrease in ba.nking lending and we investigate the effect of bank efficiency 
in tenns of the extent to which countries are able to wea.ther the financial crisis. 
We use the method offered by Raja.n and Zinga.les (1998) to measure the impact 
of bank efficiency on growth for financially dependent industries. Indeed, the reasoning 
behind of paper is as follows. T he channel through which bank effi ciency affects growth 
is the "credit-channel. " Bank efficiency positively affects t he supply of credit granted to 
firms, which in t urn increases the growth rate in real value added for industries most 
dependent on external financing. To measure bank effi ciency in financial systems, we 
use Data Envelopment Analysi. (DEA) . We give more details about t he dataset and 
this method in section 2 and Appendix A, respectively. Growth is the annual grovvth 
rate in real value added across firms and countries during the period 2009, during which 
t he crisis sprea.d from the U.S. to other countries. Financial dependence is computed 
at t he industry level using data on industrial U.S . firms. Our final sample covers 37 
countries for a total of 2611 cmmtry-industry observations. Our fir t resul t shows that 
bank efficiency relaxed credit constraints, permitting externally dependent industries 
to grow faster during t he crisis. More precisely, if we take one industry at the 75th 
percentile of externa.l financial dependence and another industry at the 25th percentile 
of external financial dependence, we find that the difference in growth rate between 
these two industries is 2.41 percentage points higher in a country at the 75th percentile 
of bank efficiency than in a country at the 25th pm·centile. T his effect is large relative 
to mean annual ind ustry value-added growth in our sample ( -4.559%). ri his confirms 
that a more efficient banking system provided external financia.lly dependent firms with 
more and better access to financing and allowing t hem to grow rapidly during the crisis. 
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Bank efficiency had a higher profitability in tenns of gTowth for financially dependent 
industries during the crisis. 
In order to clisentangle the impact of bank efficiency from other factors that might 
be correlated \vit h our measure of bank efficiency, we control for other interactions of 
external financial dependence with measures of financia.l development, bank concen-
tration and competition , bank size, bank capitalization, net interest margin, overhead 
costs , banking crises measures, bank supervision, and other government policy inter-
vention measures during the crisis. Our results continue to hold, and remain robust to 
the u e of several measures of external finaJ1cial dependence, the introduction of control 
variables, namely trade, real GDP monetary policy, exchange rate and inflation rate 
interacted with external financial dependence. It is also robust to the use of everal 
econometrie methods, such as weighted least squares and the rank method. 
Our paper is related to severa! stra.nds in the existing literature on the topic. 
First , the effects of financial development on economie grmvth have been the subject -of 
nwnerous studies. The results obtained generally show that financial development bas a 
positive and significant effect on growth (Schumpeter (1911), King and Levine (1993a, 
1993b) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beek et 
al. (2000), Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt (2004), Aghion et al. (2005)) . These studies use 
private credit to measure the level of financial development of countries. Our paper 
assesses for the first t ime the relationship between financia.l development aJ1d economie 
growth using a direct measure of bank efficiency. It is also relates to a laJ·ge empirical 
li terature on the relationship between banking market structure and growth. Cetorelli 
and Gambera (2001) study the effects of bank concentration on growth. They .find that 
bank concentration promotes the growth of t hose industria.l sectors t hat are more in 
need of external .financing by facilitating credit access to younger firms . 
Second, our paper adds to the empirical literature the relationship between growth, 
banking crises aJ1d financia.l frictions. Braun aJ1d Larr·ain (2005) assess the relationship 
between finance and the business cycle across countries and industries. They show that 
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industries that are more dependent on external finance are hit harder during recessions. 
For Raddatz (2006), la.rger liquidity needs create higher volatility, and financially un-
derdeveloped countries experience deeper crises. Kroszner et al. (2007) use the same 
approa.ch to investigate the growth impact of bank crises on industries with different 
levels of dependence on external finance. Using data from 38 developed and developing 
countries that have experienced financial crises, they find that those sectors that are 
highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contrac-
t ion of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems 
t han in countries with shallower financial systems. However, their results do not suggest 
that on net externa.Uy dependent firms fare worse in well-developed financial systems. 
Rancière et al. (2008) theoretically and empirically investigate the effects of systemic 
crises on growth using skewness and GDP growth in a large sample of cmmtries over 
the period 1960-2000. They find that countries that have experienced occasional finan-
cial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial condit ions. 
Dell 'Ariccia et al: (2008) study the effects of banking crises on growth in industrial sec-
tors and find t hat in sectors more dependent on external finance, value added, capital 
formation, and the number of establislunents grew slower than in sectors less dependent 
on external finance. The differentiai effect is stronger in developing countries where al-
ternatives to bank financing are more limited , in countries with less access to foreign 
finance, and where bank distress is more severe. Piazza (2014) theoretically studies the 
relationship between growth and crisis, and finds that in the presence of financia1 market 
imperfections, sudden stops and financial crises can simply be the natural outcome of 
a typical growth process with decreasing marginal returns to capital. Laeven and Va-
lencia (2013) analyze the impact of bank recapitalization on growth during the recent 
financial crisis. They find that the growth of firms dependent on external financing is 
disproportionately positively affected by bank capitalization policies. The remainder of 
t he paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic methodology, section 3 is 
the empirical investigation, and section 4 is t he conclusion. 
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3. 2 Methodology and Data 
To study the relationship between bank efficiency, financial dependence and growth , 
we first estimate the following econometrie specification : 
Growthj,k = Constant + fh *Country Indicators + fi2*Industry Indicators + t33*Sizej 
+ t34*Financial dependencej xEfficiency Indexk + Controlsj,k + Ej,k 
where j and k denote indu try and country, respectively. Growth is the annual growth 
rate in real value added of industry j in country k during 2009. Financial dependence 
measures industry j 's dependence on external financing, and efficiency quantifies bank 
efficiency in country k. Size i measured by the logarithm of total a. sets of industry j. 
The cmmtry and industry indicator are based on the IFS country classification code 
and the International Industry Classification Code, respectively. Following the litera-
ture, this approach is less subject to criticism regarding omitted variable bias or model 
specification compared to cross-country specifications. We eliminate the U.S. which is 
our benchmark for measuring external financial dependence. We also drop countries 
with only one or two observations, such as Czech Republic and igeria. Our data is 
composed of 37 countries for a total of 2611 country-industry observations. The coef-
ficients J)1 and fi2 capture country and industry dummies, respectively. The inclusion 
of these indicators allows us to control for factors that are unique to each country and 
industry. Our coefficient of interest is .84 . If bank efficiency has a positive and significant 
effect on gmwth for financially dependent industries, then it should be positive and 
stati tically significant different from zero. The channel through which bank efficiency 
affects growth is the "credit-channel." Specifically, bank efficiency allows a better se-
lection of borrowers and reduces the cost of credit, and a positive and significance sign 
for J)4 suggests that bank efficiency positively affects the supply of credit granted to 
firms, which in turn increases the growth rate in real value added for industries most 
dependent on external financing. \life a.lso include the size of finn captures by the co-
efficient J)3 . A positive sign of this coefficient implies that the firm size positively and 
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significatively affects growth. 
Growth rate in real value added and financial dependence Growth is t he 
annual growth rate in real value added as a percentage during the year 2009. The 
external finance dependence denotes the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of intensity 
reliance on external finance defined as a one minus ind ustry cash flow over ind ustry 
investment of large publicly-traded U.S. firms in the 1980s. 1 In terms of a robustness 
test , we use the external dependence computed over the period 1980-2006 taken from 
Laeven and Valencia (2013). Value added is measured using compustat data as the sum 
of earnings before taxes, depreciation and labor expenses. U.S . datais used to establish 
the benchmark of an industry's external dependence. In our paper we drop the U.S. 
into our specifications to treat a possible endogeneity. Table 9 shows external financial 
dependence measures across U.S. industries over the period 1980-1989 . 
Bank efficiency measure Bank efficiency is measured over the period 1999-2007 using 
the data envelope analysis (DEA) method 2 . Following Barth et al. (2013), the advantage 
of a non-parametric method compared to a parametric model, is that the latter requires 
one to assume a particular function form, thereby imposing a specifie structure on the 
shape of the efficient frontier. The non-parametric DEA method envelops the multiple 
inputs ( deposits, la bor and physical capital) and outputs ( totalloans and securities) data 
of the sample for 4050 banks in 72 countries over the period 1999-2007. The coefficient 
obtained for bank efficiency does not uffer from the problem of functional form . The 
bank efficiency score lies between 0 and 1, and a higher value obtained with the DEA 
method indicates higher efficiency in the banking sector. A lower value means lower 
efficiency among banks. Table 8 shows the list of countries with efficiency scores. For 
details about DEA model estimation, see Appendix A. 
l. The dataset cornes from Krosner et al. (2007) 
2. See Appendix A. 
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Controls Our specification control for other firm-level variables such as :firm leverage 
(lev), defined as the ratio of totalliabilities to total assets. The asset tangibility variable 
is calculated as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The Tobin's Q variable, is 
computed as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book of debt divided by the 
book value of total assets. The database of these three variables is taken from Laeven and 
Valencia (2013). Other control variables, from the World Bank WDI, 3 are used in our 
estimations : private credit , inflation rate, trade, and stock market capitalization. Private 
credit provided by the ba.nking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross 
basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. Inflation, as 
measured by the consumer priee index, refiects the annual percentage change in the cost 
to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, su ch as annually (the Laspeyres formulais generally used). 
Trade is calculated as the sum of exports (%of GDP) and imports (%of GDP). Market 
capitalization, listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies 
listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do not 
include inve. tment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicle . 
We follow Laeven and Valencia (2013) by controlling our results for total capitalization, 
defined as the sum of private credit/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP. We 
also control for the real GDP growth. To test the sensitivity of our results , we use bank 
concentration, measured as the share of assets of the three largest banks in total banking 
S) stem assets. Its value lies between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a low bank concentration 
and 1 a high bank concentration. 4 The Boone indicator Lerner and adj usted Lerner 
indices are also used in our specification to control for bank competition; we give more 
details in Appendix A. 5 Vle control for the changes in monetary policy over the period 
August 2008-March 2009, exchange rate depreciation over the per·iod August 2008-
3. The World Development Indicators are publicly avai lable at http://~Nw.worldbank . org/ . 
4. Concentration and supervisory power measures are taken from Beek et al. (2010). 
5. Data are come from Clerides et al. (2013). 
101 
March /2009, the change in monetary base/GDP over the period 2008q3-2009ql , and the 
local currency to USD, end-2009. These da.tasets come from Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
In order to take into account the effect of government policy intervention measures 
during the crisis, we control our main restùt. for a set purchases used (% of GDP) , 
announced asset purchases and lending by treasury (% of GDP) , banking guarantecs 
measured as the sum of asset guarantees (% of GDP) and bank creditors' guarantees 
(% of GDP) , and liquidity support (% of GDP). 6 We also control for banking crises 
taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013) . To continue to test the robustness of results 
we control for bank capitalization measured as the ratio of eqtùty capital to total assets 
in percentages, and bank size measured by the logarithm of total assets. 'V\Te al o use 
overhead cost measured as the accounting value of a bank's overhead cost as a share of 
its total a.'3sets, and the net interest margin defined as the accounting value of a bank's 
net interest revenue as a sha.re of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets. 7 
Table 3.1 shows the summary stabstics of our variables. The average growth rate 
in real value added over the period 2009 is -4.559%. However, we observe a high dis-
persion between the firm at the 25th percentile, which grows at -25.218%, and the firm 
at 75th percentile, which grows at 14.364%. The average of bank effi.ciency is 0.798. 
The countries with the lowest banking effi.ciency values are Lithuania (0.470), the Phi-
lippines (0.51), Pakistan (0.56) and Peru (0.57). The countries with highest banking 
effi.ciency are The United Kingdom (0.940) , Switzerland (0.920) , Belgiwn (0.920) , and 
LuxembÇ)mg (0.910). Firms required an average of 44.2% external financing. Market ca-
pitalization, private credit and total capitalization are on average 148.523%, 105.224%, 
and 253.748%, respectively. Bank concentration is on average 65.4%, with a minimum 
value of 0.291 (Luxemburg) and a maximum value of 0.944 (Sweden) . The Boone in-
dicator, Lerner and adjusted Lerner indices are on average -0.467, 0.233, and 0.180, 
6. The dataset of these variables is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
7. The data come from Beek et al. (2010) and are publicly avai lable at 
http://wYY.wor l dbank.org/ . 
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respectively. Tables 8 and 9 show countries with banking efficiency cores and external 
financial dependence across U.S . industries over the period 1980-1989, respectively. 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics continued 
Variables Obs Mean St d. Dev. Min. Max. 25th P ere. 75th Pere. 
Trade 2611 148.019 133.663 25.830 456.650 56 .370 211.23 
Real GDP growth 2611 -2.177 3.081 -1 7.955 6.771 -4.874 -0.770 
Inflation 2611 3.237 2.855 -0.290 15. 730 1.510 4.640 
Liquidity support 2611 4. 249 5.808 0 57.543 0 7.872 
Bank gua.rantees 2611 71.424 85.640 0 295.2 3.300 115.600 
Asset announced 2611 0.706 2.009 0 9.100 0 0 
Asset used 2611 0.632 1.923 0 8.200 0 0 
Crisis 2611 0.212 0.408 0 1 0 0 
3.3 R esu lts 
T his section presents the results of our specifications. The dependent variable is 
t he annua.l growth rate in real value added over the period 2009. In each specificat ion, 
we introduce the intercept , count ry and industry indica.tors. To treat heteroskedasticity 
problems in our regressions, we use vVhite's consistent standard errors for statistical 
inference. The specificat ions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
What is the effect of bank efficiency on growth for financially dep endent 
industries during the crisis ? Our main result s are shown in column (1) of Table 
2. The coefficient associated with the industry size is positive and significant at the 
1% level. This sugge. ts th at ind ustry size has a posit ive and significant direct effect 
on growth during the crisis. The interaction term bet1veen bank efficiency and ext ernal 
financial dependence enters positively and statistica.lly significant a.t the 5% leve!. This 
finding implies t hat bank efficiency matters for improved growth of firms in industries 
tha.t are more financially dependent on external finance. The regression in column (1) 
a.llows us to find the difference in growth in real value added between industries. T he 
difference in growth during the crisis between an industry at t he 75th percentile and the 
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25th percentile of external financial dependence is 2.41 percentage point higher in a 
country at t he 75th percentile of bank efficiency than in a country at the 25th percentile. 
Thi · result is the first in the existing li terature, to the best of our knowledge. Bank 
efficiency thus makes banks more resilient to financial crisis. The channel through which 
bank efficiency affects growth i the "credit-channel." During the crisis, bank efficiency 
positively affected the supply of credit granted to firms, which in turns enhanced the 
growth rate in real value added. Our main result stipulates that bank efficiency alleviates 
the negative effects of financial frictions on growth. 
In arder to disentangle the impact of bank effi.ciency from other factors that might 
be correlated with our measure of bank efficiency we control for other interactions of ex-
ternal financial dependence with measures of financial development, bank concentration 
and competition, bank size, bank capitalization, net interest margin, overhead costs, 
banking crises measures , bank supervision, and other government policy interventions 
measures during the cri is. This a.pproach is also used by (Aghion et al. (2005), Claessens 
and Laeven (2005) among others). This allows us to check if the positive œlatioru hip 
between bank efficiency and growth is robust to including several variables listed above. 
Is bank efficiency simply a proxy for financial development ? The measure of 
bank efficiency in a country may capture other aspects of financial development. More 
precisely, our main result could simply be that countrie with a high level of financial 
development have more efficient banking systems. Financial development could have of-
fered alternative sources of firms that are more dependent on external finance during the 
recent global financial crisis. To disentangle bank efficiency from financial development 
we introduce the interaction term between market capitalization and external financial 
dependence in column (2) and the interaction tenn between total capitalization and 
external financial dependence in column (3). \"'e follow the literature by using market 
and total capitalization as measures of the level of financial development of a given 
country. The coefficient of the interaction term between our measure of bank efficiency 
and external financial dependence is positive and ignificant at the 5% and 10% levels, 
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respectively. This suggests that bank efficiency enhances the growth rate for financia.lly 
dependent industries during crisis. However , the interaction term between market and 
total capitalization, and external financial dependence enters positively but insignHicant. 
Interestingly, we show that bank efficiency disproport ionately enhances the gwwt h rate 
for financially dependent industries. This suggests that the finding that industries with 
greater financial dependence benefit in growth terms from greater bank efficiency is not 
due to a bett er level of fina.ncial development. 
Table 3 .3 Financial dependence, growth, bank efficiency, financial development and 
bank concentration as controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size 0.961 *** 0.961 *** 0.960*** 0.968*** 
(0.316) (0.3 16) (0.316) (0.315) 
Bank effi ciency x Financial dependence 0.348** 0.345** 0.327* 0.315** 
(0.154) (0.161) (0.172) (0.161 ) 
Jv1arket capitalization x Financial dependence 0.001 
(0.015) 
Total capitalization x Financial dependence 0.003 
(0.013) 
Concent ration x Financial dependence 0.089 
(0.119) 
Industry indicators Y es Y s Y es Ye 
Country indicators Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Number of observations 2611 2611 2611 2611 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 
Note that (*** , ** and * ) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Robust standards 
errors a re in p arenthesis, ali regres ions include a con tant , co untry and industry fixed effects. T he 
dependent vaüable is the annua l growth rate in real value added of a finn du ring the period 2009. 
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I s bank efficiency s imply a proxy for bank competition or concentra tion? 
In column (4), wc introducc t he interaction term between concentration and cxternal 
financial dependence. The coefficient associated with firm size remains positive and si-
gnificant at the 1% level. The interaction term between bank efficiency and external 
fina.ncia.l dependence is positively and significantly rela.ted to growth a.t the 5% level. 
However, the interaction term between bank concentration and external financial de-
pendence is positive and insignificant. Our re ult is not driven by bank concentration. 
We find that the real gmwth rate in value added is disproportiona.tely positively affected 
by bank efficiency for financia.lly dependent industries. 
In terms of bank competition, we use three measures, namely the Boone indica-
tor, the Lerncr index and the adjusted Lerner index. Wc do not use the Pa.nza.r and 
Rosse (1987) approach a.pplicd in the empirical studies to mcasure bank competition 
for several reasons. First , Bikker et al. (2012) find tha.t the priee equation and scaled 
revenue function are not va.lid measures of bank competition and cannot identify im-
perfect competition. Second, Clerides et al. (2013) show that the H-stati. tic obtained 
with the Panzar and Rosse method is not a continuous variable because it maps the va-
rious degrees of market power only weakly. We present the results of our specifications 
in Table 3.4. Column (1) introduces the interaction term between the Boone indica-
tor and external financial dependence. The coefficient of the interaction tenn between 
bank efficiency and external financia.l dependence remains positive and ignificant at 
the 5% level, while the coefficient associated with the interaction between the Boone 
indicator and external fina:ncial dependence is positive but insignificant. Columns (2) 
and (3) add the interactions term between the Lerner and the adjusted Lerner indices, 
respectively. Bank efficiency interacted with external financial dependence enters positi-
vely and sta.tistically significa.nt at the 5% level. This suggests tha.t firms that are more 
financia.lly dependent grow faster in fina.ncial systems tha.t are more efficient. It a.lso 
suggests tha.t our main result do not suffer from possible endogeneity problems with 
bank competition measures. The coefficients associated with the interaction terms bet-
ween the Boone indica.tor , the Lerner and adjusted Ler·ner indices and external financial 
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dependence enter positively but insignificant. 
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Is bank effi.ciency simply a proxy for bank supervision? \ l\fe investigate whe-
ther our results refiect bank regulation measured by the official supervisory power rather 
than bank efficiency. Indeed, Barth et al. (2013) find a strong interaction and positive ef-
fect of official supervisory power on bank effieiency. We then control our results using the 
interaction term between supervisory power and external financial dependence. Column 
( 4) of Table 3.4 show. the results. The coefficient of the interaction term between bank 
efficiency and external financial dependence remains positive and significant at the 1% 
level, even though it changes in magnitude. Bank efficiency has a positive and significant 
effect on growth for financially dependent industries during the crisis. More specifically, 
we show that t he difference in growth dming the crisis between an industry at the 75th 
percentile and t he 25th percentile of external financial dependence is 0 .. 52 percentage 
point higher in a country at t he 75th percentile of bank efficiency thau in a country at 
t he 25th percentile. This effect is largely relative to mean annual industry value-added 
growth in our. ample (-4.559%). The official supervisory power interacted with external 
financial dependence is negatively related to growth but remains insignificant. 
Is bank effi.ciency simply a proxy for net interest margin and overhead cost? 
Beek et aL (2010) argue that higher levels of net interest margins and overhead costs 
indicate lower levels of banking efficiency. It could be that our measure of bank effi-
ciency depends on net interest margins or overhead costs. We introduce in column (5) 
and (6) , the interaction terms between net interest mar gin and external financial depen-
dence, and overhead cost and external financial dependence, respectively. As we can, 
our interest variable, namely the interaction term between bank efficiency and external 
financial dependence enters positively and statistically significant at the 1% and 10% 
levels, respectively even though the magnitude of t he coefficients changes. This suggèsts 
that bank efficiency increases the growth rate of firms in industries that are more de-
pendent on external financing. This confirms t hat our result is nit driven by net interest 
margins and overhead costs. 
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Is bank efficiency sim ply a proxy for ot her count r y ch a racteristics? In Table 
3.5, we control for the level of economie development measured by t he real GDP growth , 
t he degree of openness measured by the tracle, inflation and exchange rates and changes 
in monetary policy and monetary base that may affect our measme of bank efficiency. 
Controlling for these variables reduces concerns abou t omitted variables. Columns (1) 
and (2) add t he interaction terms between real GDP growth and external financial de-
pendence, and tra.de and external financia.l dependence. F irm size rema.ins posit ively 
and . ignificantly related to growth at the 1% level. The interaction t erm between bank 
efficiency and fi nancial dependence remains posit ive a.nd significant a.t t he 5% level. T his 
suggests t hat bank efficiency has a. posit ive and ignifica.nt growth effect for financially 
dependent industries . Real GDP growth and t racle posit ively affect growth for finan-
cially dependent industries even though the coefficients are insignificant . Inflation and 
exchange rates are int roduced in columns (3) and (4). Our interest variable, namely 
t he interaction between bank efficiency and external financial dependence remains po-
sitive and significant at the 5% level. Monetary policy variables are used in columns (5) 
and (6) . We .find that bank effi ciency interacted wit h external financial dependence is 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This suggests that bank 
efficiency plays a positive and significant for growth in financially dependent industries 
during a crisis. We add ali variables in column (7). We show that bank efficiency dispro-
portionately increases the growth rate in real value added of fu·ms that are dependent on 
external financing dming the crisis. Our main results remain robust with t he use of real 
GDP growth rate, ti:'acle, inflation and exchange rates, and monetary policy and base 
as controls, and validate at the same time the fact that bank effi.ciency makes count ries 
more resilient to financial frictions. To t he best of our knowledge, this finding is the first 
in the existing litera.ture. 
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The effects of government interventions dur ing the crisis To obtain the results 
featured above, wc conducted sorne robustne s checks using govermnent intervention 
measures as controls, as shawn in Table 3.6. We first control for the interaction terms 
betvveen announced assets purchases and asset purchases used, and external financial 
dependence. The results are presented in colwnns (1) and (2). Bank efficiency interacted 
with external financial dependence is po ·itively and significantly rela.ted to growth for 
financially dependent industries at the 5% level, while a.nnounced assets and assets 
used intera.cted wüh external financia.l dependence enter positively but in ignificant. 
This suggests that our result is not driven by bank policy intervention measures during 
the crisis. Indeed, bank efficiency exerts a positive and sig11ificant effect on growth of 
firms in industries that are more dependent on external financing. We investigate two 
other measures used during the crisis by governments, namely bank guarantees and 
liquidity support. Controlling for the interaction term between bank guarantces and 
external financial dependence in column (3) we show that our interest variable remains 
remain. positive and significant at the 5% level. However, bank guarantees interacted 
with financial dependence enters negatively and insignificant. F inally, column (4) adds 
liquidity interacted with external financial dependence as a control. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between bank effi.ciency and external financial dependence is positive 
and statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Thi suggests that 
the real growth rate in value added is disproportionately positively affected by bank 
effi.ciency for financially dependent industries. 
The effect of banking crises ver sus non-banking crises It could also be that 
our result depends on whether the impact of the financial crisis on the banking sector is 
a function of the measme of bank efficiency. \Ve control our results for banking crises in 
Table 3.7. In column (1) we introduce the interaction term between the banking crisis 
variable and external financial dependence. Banking crisis is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the country cxperienced a systcmic banking crisis in 2009 and 0 if not. 
The coefficient associated with the interaction term between bank efficiency and external 
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Table 3.6 Financial dependence, growth, bank efficiency and government interventions 
as controls 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size 0.959*** 0.95 *** 0.964*** 0.961 *** 
(0.315) (0.315) (0.317) (0.316) 
Bank efficiency x Financial dependence 0.329** 0.328** 0.355** 0.365** 
(0.161) (0.159) (0.154) (0.171 ) 
Assets announced x Financial dependence 0.352 
(0.717) 
Assets us d x Financial dependence 0.430 
(0.735) 
Bank gua.ra.ntees x Financial dcpendencc dependenee -0 .005 
(0.020) 
Liquidity support x Financial dcpendence -0.076 
(0.334) 
Industry indicators Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Cmmtry indicators Ye..<> Y es Ye..<> Y es 
Number of observations 2611 2611 2611 2611 
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 
Note that (***, ** and * ) indicate signi ficance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Robust standards errors are in 
parenthesi , ali regre. ions include a constant, country and industry fixed effects . The dependent variable is the annual 
growth rate in real value aclded of a. firm cluring the periocl 2009. 
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financial dependence enters positively and statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level. This suggests that our measure of bank efficiency is not a.ffected by 
the systemic banking crisis. In column (2), we include countries considered as having 
a borderline systemic banking crisis. 8 As we can see, our interest variable, namely the 
interaction term between bank efficiency and external financial dependence, remain 
positive and significant at the 10% leve!. This suggests t hat deeper bank efficiency 
enhances the growth rate in real value added for firms in industries that are more 
dependent on external financing during the crisis. 
Additional external finance dependence measures and firm controls To conti-
nue to test t he robustness of our results we introduce an alternative measure of external 
financi al dependence. This measure is calculated using the same method of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) over the period 1980-2006. The results are shawn in column (3) of Table 
3.7, and we find bank efficiency intera.cted with the external financia.l dependence enters 
positively and statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% leve!. To investi-
gate that our result is not driven by the .financial condit ion of firms , we then introduce, 
in column (4) of Table 3.7, the ratio of firm liabilities to total assets (leverage) and the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets (fixed assets) . Doing this, the interaction tenn bet-
ween bank efficiency and external financial dependence remains positive and significant 
at the 5% level, while the coefficient associated with t he fixed assets enters negatively 
and significantly at the 1%. This confirms t hat efficiency in the banking system matters 
for improved access to aU forms of external financing during the crisis, regardless of 
whether we control for firms, characteristics . 
Additional estimation methods and growth opportunities We investigate the 
sensitivi ty of our measure of bank efficiency and the results are shawn in Table 3.8. First, 
we use weighted least squares r gres ions and the rank arder of the efficiency measures; 
8. These eountries are cornposed of Franee, Greeee, Hungary, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain , 
Sweden and Switzerland. For more details, . ee La.even and Valencia (2013) 
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Table 3. 7 Financial dependence, growth, bank efficiency and banking crises as controls 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.964*** 0.975*** 
(0.315) (0.316) (0.316) (0.315) 
Bank efficiency x Financial dependence 0.301 * 0.340* 0.347** 
(0.160) (0.181) (0.154) 
Banking crisi x Financial dependence 3.047 
(3.878) 
Banking crisis border x Financial dependence 0.332 
(3.883) 
Banking efficiency .?< Financial dependence (80-06) 0.367* 
(0.208) 
Lever age -2 .964 
(3.015) 
Fi.xed assets -12.937*** 
( 4.663) 
Ind ustry indicators Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Country indicators Y es Y es Y es Y es 
Number of observations 2611 2611 2611 2611 
Nmnber of countries 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.121 0.121 0.120 0.124 
Note tha.t (***,**and* ) indica.te significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Robust standards errors are in 
parenthesis, aU regressions include a con -tant, country and industry fixed effects. The dependent va1·iable is the annual 
growth rate in real value added of a firm during the period 2009. 
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the results are shown in columns (1) and (2). rviore precisely, we use the weighted least 
squares using the inverse of the standard deviation of our efficiency measure as weights 
and the rank order of bank efficiency. The coefficient associated with the interaction 
term between bank efficiency and external financial dependence enters positively and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% and 10% levels, respective! y. This sugge ts 
that the positive effect of bank efficiency on growth for financially dependent industries is 
unaltered after using the weighted !east squares and rank order method, even though the 
coefficient of the interaction tenn in column (2) changes in magnitude. It also confirms 
our main resLùts and validates at the same time the fact that a more efficient banking 
sy. tem provides external financially dependent firms ,;.;rith more and better acces. to 
financing and allowing them to grow rapidly during the crisis . 
To show that the main result obtained is not driven by a change in growth op-
portunities rather than external financial dependence, we control our result for the 
interaction term between bank efficiency and Tobin's Q, a proxy of a firm's growth op-
portunities. 9 In column (3) , the interaction term between bank efficiency and external 
financial dependence remains positive and statistically significant at the 10% leve!, while 
the interaction between bank efficiency and Tobin 's Q is positive but insignificant. This 
suggests that om measure of external financial dependence captures the financing chan-
nel and it operates differently from the growth opportunities. Controlling for growth 
opportunities, our results remain robust and confirm that bank efficiency disproportio-
nately increases the growth rate of firms that are more dependent on external financial 
during the crisis. 
To ensure that the result is not driven by a change in working capital financing 
than external financia.l dependence, we introduce in column ( 4) the interaction tenn 
between bank efficiency and working capital needs. 10 Bank efficiency interacted with 
external financial dependence enters positively and significantly different from zero at 
9. See Fishman and Love (2007) , Claessens and Laeven (2005) , Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
10. See Raddatz (2006) , Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
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the 5% level, while the interaction between bank efficiency and capital needs is negative 
and insignificant. This suggests that bank efficiency enhances the growth rate of firms in 
indu. tries that are more dependent on external financing. More specifically, we show that 
the difference in growth dming the crisis between an industry at the 75th percentile and 
the 25th pe1·centile of external financial dependence is 2.63 percentage points higher in a 
country at the 75th percentile of bank efficiency thau in a country at the 25th percentile. 
This effect is largely relative to mean a.nnual industry va.lue-a.dded growth in om sample 
(-4.559%). 
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I s b a nk efficiency sim ply a proxy for bank size or ba nk capitalizat ion ? Fi-
nally, \vell-capltalized and larger banks are probably more efficient and that may affect 
our measure of efficiency. To take into account this fact, we control our main results 
obta.ined above using the interaction terms between bank size, bank capitalization and 
external financial dependence, respectively. We present t he results in columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 3.8. The interaction tenn between ban.k efficiency and external financial is 
positively and significan tly related to gm wth rate at the 10% level. This suggests that 
bank efficiency has a positive and ignificant effect on growth for fina.ncially dependent 
industries during t he crisis. This confirms t hat effi ciency in the banking system matters 
for improved access to all fonns of external financing during t he crisis, regardless of 
whether we control for bank size or bank capitalization. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the relationship between bank efficiency, financial dependence 
and economie growth during the financial crisis. Our study focuses on international 
evidence from 37 count ries over a wide variety of industries. We first find that bank ef-
ficiency enhances growth in real value added for financially dependent industries during 
the crisis. Our results remain robust to the use of several measures of external financial 
dependence and the use of control variables. We especially control for the level of fi-
nancial development, bank concentration and competit ion , bank ize and capitalization , 
bank supervision , net interest margin , overhead costs, the level of economie developmcnt 
measured by real GDP growth rate, inflation and trade. We also control our results for 
cxchange rate, changes in monct ary policy, growth opportunitics and working capital 
needs as an alternative measures of financial dependence. 
T his paper contributes to the litera.ture on financial frictions with new evidence 
of the importance of bank efficiency through the credi t channel. Efficiency makes banks 
more resilient to shock , thereby po itively and significantly affecting growth rate of 
firms that are more dependent on external financing. 
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Appendix A : Bank efficiency measure 
Bank efficiency using the DEA approach. This section draws from Bru"th et al. (2013). 
Suppose the sample size is n and there are m inputs and s outputs for each bru1k. Let 
Xj = (Xjl,Xj2, ···,Xmj) as mx 1 vector of inputs for bank j , X= (x1 , x 2, ... ,xn) as 
mx n matrix of inputs, Y.i = (Yjt,Yj2, ... ,Xsj) as s x 1 vector of outputs of bank j, and 
Y = (Yt, Y2, .. . , Yn) as s x n matrix of outputs, respective! y. The outputs are : totalloans 
and securities, while the inputs include : deposits , labor and phyiscal capital. The data 
of outputs and inputs are taking from Bankscope ru1d covers 4050 banks in 72 countries 
over the period 1999-2007. The variable returns to scale the DEA model can be written 
with the following n linear programming problems for each bank j (j = 1, 2, ... , n) 
max('V;j ~ 1ixj, yj, X , Y)= max('lj;j ~ 1i'lj;jyj :S Y À.i• XÀj :S Xj, Àj ~ O,f~Àj = 1) 
(.3.1) 
where ft denotes an n x 1 vector of ones, 'lj;j denotes a scalar parameter , and Àj = 
(Àtj, À2j, ... Ànj) 1 denotes an x 1 non-negative vector of parameters. 
The inttütion of (3.1) is as follows. For each bank j, a virtual output Y Àj is 
constructecl as a weighted output of all banks by choosing sorne non-negative weights, 
Àj ~ 0, I~ Àj = 1. It then seeks to expand the virtual output Y Àj as much as possible, 
subject to the inputs constraints of bank j , X Àj ::; Xj . The virtual output Y Àj is then 
comparecl with the actual output Yj of bank j. If the mEL'cimizecl virtual output Y Àj is 
higher than the actual output of bank j by a sca.lar factor 'lj;j > 1, then the bank j is 
inefficient. Otherwise, bank j is loca.ted at the efficiency frontier since 1/Jj = 1. So, the 
input-oriented efficiency score is defined &'3 e]fj =Ji (0::; e]]j::; 1) for bank j. 
Boone indica.tor The empirical Boone et al. (2005) and Boone (2008) indicator is as 
follows : 
ln1ri = L + '!9lnmGï (3.2) 
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where 1r is the profit of the bank i and mc the marginal cost. The maJ:ginal cost of bank 
i in the period t using linear cost function is given by : 
(3.3) 
where c is the total cost of bank i in the period t , q is bank output, d is the value of 
bank deposits, w are the priees of input. · and e is a disturbance. We can see easily that 
aCi,t is the marginal cost of bank output. The data for the banking sector are taken 
8qi,t 
from Bankscope, an unbalanced panel dataset of 89,778 observations corresponding to 
12,206 banks that were operating in 148 countries between 1997-2010. The bank co ts 
c are measured by real expenses of bank i in the period t; bank output q is measur d 
by the real total earning assets (loans, securities derivatives, investments and insurance 
assets); dis the real total deposits and short-ter·m funding. First, the input priees w1 is 
measured by the priee of la bor, which is proxied by the ratio of personnel ex penses to 
total assets, and second , w2 is measured by the priee of physical capital, which is proxied 
by the ratio of total depreciation and other capital expenses to total fixed as. ets. 
Lerner and Adjusted Lerner indices Clerides et al. (2013) use an unbalanced panel 
with 89,778 observations, corresponding to 12,206 banks operating in 148 countries 
between 1997-2010. The cost equation takes the form : 
TCi,t = f(qi,t, 'Wl,it: Wk ,it : Wd,it) (3.4) 
Vlhere TC is tota.l cast, qi,t is bank output, and Wt,it: Wk,it, Wd ,it are factor priees for 
labor, capital and deposits , respectively. Total cost is measured by real total expenses, 
while bank output is measured by real total earning assets . The priees for labor, capital 
and deposits are measured by the ratio of personal expenses to total assets, by t he ratio 
of capital expenditures to fixed assets and as total interest expenses over total customer 
deposits, respectively. For the adjusted Lerner index, the profit by using the total profits 
before taxes. The aggregate priee is calculated as the ratio of tota.l income over total 
earning assets . 
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Table 3. 9 Bank efficiency scores. 
Isocode3 Isocod e2 Country Efficiency score 
ARG AR Argentina 0.66 
AUS AU Australia 0.81 
AUT AT Austria o. 1 
BEL BE Belgium 0.92 
BRA BR Brazil 0.75 
CAN CA Canada 0.88 
CHE CH Switzerla.nd 0.92 
DEU DE German y 0.87 
D IK DK Denmark 0.76 
ESP ES Spain 0.91 
FRA FR France 0. 89 
GBR GB United Kingdorn 0.94 
GRC GR Greece 0.75 
HKG HK Hong Kong 0.82 
HRV HR Croatia 0.54 
HUN HU Hungary 0.78 
IND IN In dia. 0.7 
ITA IT Ital y 0.83 
KEN KE Kenya 0.56 
LTU LT Lithuania 0.47 
LUX LU Luxembourg 0.91 
LVA LV Lat via 0.56 
?li! AR MA 1orocco 0.65 
MYS MY Malaysia 0.76 
NLD L . · etherlands o. 1 
NZL z New Zealand 0.75 
PAK PK Pakistan 0.56 
PER PE Peru 0.57 
PHL PH Philippines 0.51 
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Table 3.10 Bank efficiency scores . 
Isocode3 I socode2 Country Efficiency score 
POL PL Po land 0.59 
PRT PT Portugal 0.84 
RUS RU Russia 0.73 
SGP SG Singapore 0.86 
SVN SI Slovenia 0.65 
SWE SE Sw den 0.79 
THA TH Thailand 0.78 
TUR TR Tm key 0.75 
ZAF ZA South Africa 0.72 
126 
Table 3.11 External financial dependence 1980-1989 across U.S. industries. 
ISIC code Sector External financial d ep endence 
314 Tobacco -0.45 
3G1 Pottery -0.15 
323 Leather -0.14 
3211 Spinning -0.09 
324 Footwear -0.08 
372 Nonferrous metal 0.01 
322 Apparel 0.03 
353 Petroleum r finerie. 0.04 
369 Tonmetal products 0.06 
313 Bever ages 0.08 
371 Iron and steel 0.09 
311 Food products 0.14 
3411 Pulp, paper 0.15 
3513 Synthetic resins 0.16 
341 Paper and products 0.18 
342 Printing and publi hing 0.20 
352 Other chemicals 0.22 
355 Rubber products 0.23 
332 Furniture 0.24 
381 ,fetal products 0.24 
3511 Basic excluding fertilizers 0.25 
331 ·wood products 0.28 
384 Transportation equipment 0.31 
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Table 3.12 External fina.ncial dependence 1980-1989 across U.S. industries. 
ISIC code Sector External financial d ependence 
354 Pet roleum and coal products 0.33 
3843 Motor vehicle 0.39 
321 Textile 0.40 
3 2 Mad1inery 0.45 
3841 Ship 0.46 
390 Other industries 0.47 
362 Glass 0.53 
383 Electric machinery 0.77 
385 Professiona.l goods 0.96 
3 32 Radio 1.04 
3825 Office and computing 1.06 
356 Plastic proclucts 1.14 
3522 Drugs 1.49 
CONCLUSIO 
Dans cette thèse nous étudions l'importance du développement financier et le 
rôle du système bancaire dans le développement économique. Nous montrons le rôle 
prépondérant du marché bancaire comme moteur pour la croissance et le développement 
économiques à l'aide de trois articles scientifiques. 
Le premier article de la thèse étudie les effets négatifs de la concentration bancaire 
sur la croissance économique. Le second article analyse le rôle des réformes bancaires 
sur la croissance, et enfin le dernier article étudie l'importance de l'efficience bancaire 
pour la croissance en temps de crise économique. 
Nous pouvons donc retenir trois principaux résultats obtenus dans cette thèse. 
Nous montrons que la concentration bancaire affecte négativement la croissance économique 
pour tous les pays. Cependant, cet effet est d 'autant plus négatif pour les pays qui sont 
proches de la frontière technologique mondiale. Ce résultat s'explique en partie par 
le fait que la concentration bancaire diminue les montants alloués aux entrepreneurs 
parce qu'elle augmente les taux d 'intérêts des emprunts. Ainsi, il en résulte une baisse 
de l'innovation et par conséquent de la croissance économique. De plus , la concentra-
tion bancaire affecte plus négativement les pays proches de la frontière technologique 
mondiale. ous observons des opportunités d 'innovation plus importantes pour ces pays, 
une hausse de la concentration bancaire diminuant les montants alloués à l'innovation, il 
s'ensuit une baisse importante de la croissance économique. Empiriquement , nous mon-
trons également que la concentration bancaire me. ·urée par plusieurs indices a un effet 
négatif et significatif sur la croissance économique. Cet effet est d 'autant plus négatif 
lorsque le pays s'approche de la frontière technologique mondiale. Ces résultats sont 
robustes à l introduction de plusieurs types de variables de contrôle et à l'utilisation de 
plusiems techniques économétriques pom traiter l 'endogénéité. 
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Le second résul tat important à retenir est le suivant : les réformes bancaires 
peuvent avoir des effets différents sm la croissance pom les pays en fonction de leur ni-
veau de développement technologique. Nous analysons un cadre t héorique et empirique 
en utilisant l'idée des institutions appropriées poux étudier ces effets . Nous montrons 
qu'il existe un seuil de développement technologique à partir duquel les réforme. ban-
caires exercent un effet positif et significatif sur la croissance économique. Quand tm 
pays atteint ou dépasse ce seuil, il doit impérativement réformer son système bancaire 
par la libre entrée pour augmenter son taux de croissance. Cependant, pour les pay dont 
le niveau de développement technologique est inférieur à ce seuil, les réformes bancaires 
par w1e libre entrée ne sont pas . oul1aitables. Ces résultats ont assez intuitifs dans le 
sens où ils permettent de mettre en place des politiques économiques en fonction du seuil 
de développement technologique que nous calculons théoriquement et empiriquement. 
L'innovation et la R&D sont les moteurs de la croissance dans no modèles théoriques. 
Ainsi, pour les pays proches de la frontière technologique mondiale, des réformes ban-
caires approfondies permettent aux entrepreneurs d'obtenir plus facilement des fonds 
dédiés à l'innovation en payant des taux d' intérêts plus faibles. Ce proces us augmente, 
par voie de conséquence, la croissance économique. En effet, quand les pays sont loin du 
seuil de développement technologique, des réformes bancaires ne sont pas nécessaires. 
Nous observons des problèmes d 'asymétries informationnelles très élevées dans les sec-
teurs bancaires de ces pays. Le pouvoir de marché dans le secteur bancaire peut pallier 
ces lacunes en établissant des relations de proximité et de confiance entre les banques 
et les entrepreneur . Ce processus facilite l'obtention de crédits pom l'innovation et 
augmente la croissance économique. Cependant, une fois que le pays atteint le niveau 
de développement technologique, il doit impérativement réformer son système bancaire 
pour continuer à bénéficier de taux de croissance élevés. Nous validons empiriquement 
ce résultat en utilisant un échantillon de 78 pays sur la période 1980-2010. L'effet des 
réformes bancaires ·ur la croissance dépend du niveau de développement technologique. 
Ce résultat est robuste à l'utilisation des données en coupe transversale et panel ainsi 
qu'à l'introduction de plusieurs types de variables de contrôle. 
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Le troisième et dernier résultat important à retenir dans cette thèse est le sui-
vant : en période de crise économique, les pays disposant de marchés bancaires efficients 
résistent mieux aux chocs négatifs liés aux contraintes de crédit et croissent plus vite. 
Nous montrons empiriquement que l'efficience dans le secteur bancaire affecte positive-
ment et significativement le taux de crois ance pour les industries qui ont le plus be. oin 
de financement externe. Un marché bancaire efficient diminue les cont raintes de crédit 
pour les indu tries qui ont le plus besoin de financement externe. Ce résultat est robuste 
à l'introduction de plusieur types de variables de contrôle pour dissocier les effets réels 
de l'efficience bancaire sur la croissance. 
Cette thèse apporte donc trois nouvelles contributions à la li ttérature étudiant 
le lien entre le développement financier et la croissance économique, en tenant de la 
structure microéconomique du marché bancaire. Pour en arriver là, nous avons présenté 
trois modèles théorique · et empiriques sur les effets de la structure elu marché ban-
caire à savoir la concentration , la concurrence et l 'efficience bancaires sur la croissance 
économique. Malgré l'importance des ces nouveaux résultats, il s'agit d 'un programme de 
recherche et d 'une nouvelle voie de recherche novateurs que nous ouvrons pour toute la 
communauté scientifique. Nous suggérons ainsi de continuer à travailler sm ces modèles 
pour apporter de nouvelles réponses sm le sujet. 
ous espérons que cette t hèse permettra également de réduire les inégalités entre 
pays riches et pauvres. De ce fait , elle suggère aux décideurs politiques et économiques 
de tenir compte de la structure microéconomique du marché bancaire pour définir des 
progTammes de développement durable, efficace et de long terme. 
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